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INTRODUCTION

A year ago this past November, Carley Christie of California at-

tended her high school's homecoming dance.1 This rite of passage
represented a major milestone for the 14-year-old freshman since six
years ago she was diagnosed with kidney cancer. Carley's HMO declined to pay for treatment by a surgeon with expertise and substantial
experience in the removal of her particular cancer. After assessing
Carley's condition, the HMO judged the specialized surgery as medically unnecessary. Instead, it directed her to a general surgeon.
Through their own means, Carley's parents persisted in their efforts

to get a specialist. After four years of campaigning by the Christies,

California fined the HMO half a million dollars and ordered reimbursement of medical expenses incurred. Carley's father now rejoices
t Mr. Giesler is a Harvard graduate and associate at Morgan Stanley Dean Wit-

ter in Houston.

1. As recounted by Marilyn Chase, New 'Bill of Rights' Makes a Modest Start At
Protecting Patients, WALL ST. J., Nov. 24, 1997, at B1.
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in her prognosis: "She's doing wonderfully." 2 American health care,
in general, and managed care, in particular, are not supposed to work
this way. As the Christies' trauma evidences, both remain works in
progress.
Managed care 3 has significantly influenced the recent development
of American medical care. 4 Despite first receiving widespread attention during the health care reform debates of 1992-94, 5 managed care
has long been part of America's health care system.6 Congress' failure
to enact comprehensive national health care legislation did not slow
the growth of managed care. Since 1993, the total number of managed care organizations (MCOs) 7 has expanded dramatically, and
MCOs have spread to new markets. Millions of Americans have
switched from traditional indemnity plans to managed care.8 Today,
nearly 75% of insured workers 9 receive their health care from MCOs,
up from less than 30% in 1988.10
2. Id. at B1.
3. There is no generally agreed upon definition of the term "managed care."
However, "Broadly defined, it encompasses any measure that, from the perspective of
the purchaser of healthcare, favorably effects the price of services, the site at which
the services are received, or their utilization." Helene L. Parise, The Proper Extension
of Tort Liability Principles in the Managed Care Industry, 64 TEMP. L. REV. 977, 979
(1991).
4. See FAMILIES USA FOUND., PREMIUM PAY: CORPORATE COMPENSATION IN
AMERICA'S HMOs 1 (Apr. 1998).
5. In November 1993, President Clinton introduced the Health Security Act to
Congress, H.R. 3600, 103d Cong. (1993). See The White House Domestic Policy

Council,

HEALTH SECURITY: THE PRESIDENT'S REPORT TO THE AMERICAN PEOPLE

(1993). In considering the Act, Congress debated the merits of universal health insurance, community-rated insurance premiums, capitated payments, and various corporate structures designed to create a national health care system. See Victor R. Fuchs,
The Clinton Plan: A Researcher Examines Reform, I HEALTH AFF. 102 (Spring (1)
1994).
6. Managed care began as a minor presence in 1929 and with the advent of the
Kaiser Health Plan during World War II. See Manged Care Online, Managed Care
Primer (last modified Oct. 15, 1997) <http://www.medicarehmo.com/mcprimer.htm>.
Health maintenance organizations have existed since around the 1940s. See id. The
Health Maintenance Organization Act of 1973, 42 U.S.C. § 300e (1973), encouraged
their proliferation. See Laurie Zoloth-Dorfman & Susan Rubin, The Patient as Commodity: Managed Care and the Question of Ethics, 6 J. CLINICAL ETHICS 339, 339
(1995).
7. For simplicity, this article uses the term "managed care organization" as a general term to encompass a complex variety of managed care organizations. Two of the
most well known types of MCOs are health maintenance organizations ("HMOs")
and preferred provider organizations ("PPOs"). HMOs and PPOs are also general
terms; there are at least four types of HMOs, three types of PPOs, and hybrid forms
exist. See generally James P. Freiburg, The ABCs of MCOs: An Overview of Managed
Care Organizations, 81 ILL. B.J. 584, 584-88 (1993).
8. Over 165 million patients belong to coordinated care programs of networkedbased health care systems. American Association of Health Plans, MANAGED CARE
FACTS, 2-3 (1998). This represents a more than 120% increase since 1990. See id.
9. See id.
10. See Gail Jenson et al., The New Dominance of Managed Care: Insurance
Trends in the 1990s, 16 HEALTH AFF. 125, 134 (Jan.-Feb. 1997).
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This growth in managed care stemmed, at least in part, from a growing sense that "health care costs ... were spiraling out of control."'I
From 1985 until 1992, health care costs grew from $429 billion to $837
billion annually.' 2 Respectively, these figures represent 10.3% and
13.4% of the United States' gross domestic product-a substantial
jump both in absolute and percentage terms. Employers, legislators,
and other policy-makers believed that the traditional fee-for-service
3
medical system could not adequately contain these costs.'
However, as managed care has rapidly gained acceptance its popular perception has diminished. 1 4 The media regularly publishes ac-5

counts of MCO denials of care and reimbursements to enrollees.'

11. FAMILIES USA FOUND., HIT AND MISS: STATE MANAGED CARE LAWS 1 (July
1998). See also Parise, supra note 3, at 977 (noting that "[t]he restructuring [in health
care from fee-for-service insurance to managed care] is due primarily to the continual
rise in health care costs.").
12. See Healthcare Financing Administration, National Health Expenditures Table
(last modified Oct. 29, 1998) <http://www.hefa.gov/stats/nhe%2Doact/tables/+09.
htm>.
13. See generally MARC A. RODWIN, MEDICINE, MONEY & MORALS: PHYSICIANS'
CONFLICTS OF INTEREST 55-57 (1993). Professor Rodwin notes that insurance companies (third-party payors) pay for the vast majority of health care costs in the United
States. Accordingly, consumers do not directly bear the costs of the medical services
they receive and have little incentive to seek the most reasonably-priced physician. In
addition, many consumers tend to seek health care in moments of crisis and will not
consider cost to be the most important factor in selecting a physician. See id. at 13-14.
14. Public applause when actress Helen Hunt lambastes HMOs in the 1997 movie
"As Good As It Gets" has been well documented. See, e.g., Jacke Calmes, Images
Shape Debates Nationwide, WALL ST. J., June 25, 1998, at A10; David S. Hilzenrath,
Art Imitates Life When It Comes to Frustration with HMOs, WASH. POST, Feb. 10,
1998, at C1 (quoting Molly Ann Broide, director of special projects for the Henry J.
Kaiser Family Foundation, as saying: "I think the [applause line in "As Good As It
Gets"] has real implications. HMOs have become sort of the villain in our society.");
Peter T. Kilborn, Mounting Anger Over HMOs a Major Issue in Campaigns, HOUSTON CHRON., May 17, 1998, at A12; Bennett Roth, Texas Has a Big Stake in Health
Care Debate, HOUSTON CHRON., March 8, 1998, at Al.
15. See e.g., David Moran, Federal Regulation of Managed Care: An Impulse in
search of a Theory?, 16 HEALTH AFF. 7, 9 (Nov.-Dec. 1997); Alison Bass, Therapists
Say Insurer Gag Order Hurts Patients;Health ProfessionalsTell of a Blacklist, BOSTON
GLOBE, Dec. 20, 1995, at 1, available in 1995 WL 5966892; Susan Brink, How Your
HMO Could Hurt You: Managed-CareDoctors Concerned about Their Incomes Have
an Incentive to Stint on Care, US NEWS & WORLD REP., Jan. 15, 1996, at 62; Susan
Brink & Nancy Shute, Are HMOs the Right Prescription?,US NEWS & WORLD REP.,
Oct. 13, 1997, at 60; George J. Church et al., Backlash Against HMOs: Doctors, Patients, Unions, Legislators are Fed Up and Say They Won't Take it Anymore, TIME,
Apr. 14, 1997, at 32; Edward Dolnick, Death by HMO-One Woman's Horror Story,
GLAMOUR, Feb., 1996, at 158; For a Human Balance, Editorial, N.Y. TIMES, March
19, 1996, at A22; Jeffrey M. Landaw, Mr. Kafka, Call Your Office, BALTIMORE SUN,
Apr. 3, 1997, at 19A; Erik Larson, The Soul of an HMO, TIME, Jan. 22, 1996, at 44;
The Rights of Patients, by Law, Editorial, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 22, 1997, at A14; Olmos
Roan & Shari Roan, HMO 'Gag Clauses' on Doctors Spur Protest, L.A. TIMES, Apr.
14, 1996, at Al; Ellyn E. Spragins, Beware Your HMO, NEWSWEEK, Oct. 23, 1995, at
54; Too Many HMOs Stint on Emergency-Room Care, Editorial, USA TODAY, Apr. 9,
1997, at 10A (reciting "[tlales from the crypt of managed care"). For a compilation of
hundreds of such anecdotes, see GEORGE ANDERS, HEALTH AGAINST WEALTH:

Published by Texas A&M Law Scholarship, 2022

3

Texas Wesleyan Law Review, Vol. 6 [2022], Iss. 1, Art. 4

TEXAS WESLEYAN LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 6

Television has also exploited the dramatic potential of managed
care. 16 One commentator has observed that:
[P]ractically everybody covered by a managed-care health insurance plan has some story about a suffered indignity, petty or grand,
foisted on him or her by a callous or ignorant health insurer.
Even if one's annoyance is trivial, it makes a person inclined to
nod one's head vigorously when hearing about the major-league
horrors HMOs are alleged to inflict on helpless citizens. And one
hears it a lot these days. Over the past several months, we have had
newsmagazine covers and presidential pronouncements replete with
anecdotal horror stories about treatments denied and 'gag rules' imposed by HMOs on their physicians to keep patients in the dark
about the best treatment available to them.
...In the time-honored journalistic tradition of championing the
average guy against the rapacious big-money interests, it has become a mainstay for news editors to order stories on outrages
among HMOs. Reading the stories and hearing the speeches, it is
easy to believe that HMOs are all run by greedy and rapacious
sadists concerned more about squeezing out an extra dollar of profit
than providing basic aid and comfort to afflicted policyholders.
And lots of distinguished people, including not just politicians but
17
also physicians and hospital administrators, are saying just that.
Reports of high MCO profits and generous MCO executive compensation only exacerbates public discontent with managed care. 8 In a
HMOs AND THE BREAKDOWN OF MEDICAL TRUST (1996). See also Louise Kertesz,
Backlash Continues: Survey Finds Managed Care Is Still the Bad Guy in Many Ameri-

cans' Eyes,

MOD. HEALTHCARE,

Nov. 10, 1997, at 33 ("People seem to generalize

from anecdotal reports in the news about problems with managed care. When asked

about specific examples taken from news stories about the problems some people
have reported ..

with managed care, the public's perception is that these are fairly
BARRON'S, March 4,
1996, at 29 ("As if smelling blood in the water, newspapers and magazines have
.

common occurrences."); Maggie Mahar, Time for a Checkup,

turned from cheerful if boring tales of HMO's ability to contain costs to horror stories
about patients who requested a particular procedure were turned down by HMO administrators, and subsequently died.").
16. See Burkhard Bilger, TV's Powerful Doctor Shows vs. the H.M.O., N.Y. TIMES,

Dec. 22, 1996, at H41 (noting that television dramas use MCOs to "play the same role
that Russians and Arabs used to play in movies: dark forces against which the forces
of light must battle."); Barbara D. Phillips, Review, He's No Giuliani, WALL ST. J.,
Oct. 6, 1997, at A20 ("The big HMO and its employees are depicted as greedy at best,
evil at worst-white-collar gangsters deserving of whatever federal threats and punishments can be brought to bear.").
17. Norman Ornstein, HMO's Rightful Credo: No Pain, No Gain, USA TODAY,
March 24, 1997, at 15A.
18. In 1996, the 25 highest paid HMO executives had an average compensation,
exclusive of un-exercised stock options, of more than $6.2 million. The median compensation exceeded $4.8 million. See FAMILIES USA FOUND., supra note 4, at 3; see
also Andy Dworkin, Compensation Averages $4.4 Million For Top HMO Executives,
Study Says, DALLAS MORNING NEWS, Apr. 2, 1998, at 2D; Milt Freudenheim, PennyPinching HMOs Showed Their Generosity in Executive Paychecks, N.Y. TIMES, Apr.

11, 1995, at D1.
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recent survey, 69% of Americans considered HMO regulation very
important to the nation. 19 Forty-five percent say that during the past
few years, the quality of healthcare for patients with HMOs and other
managed care plans decreased.2 °
The federal government is considering responses to the problems
that have alarmed managed care consumers." In 1997, President
Clinton established a health care quality advisory commission "to find

ways to ensure quality and to ensure the rights of consumers in health
care are protected. 22 Also, in the last year Congress has considered
competing Republican and Democratic bills imposing national regulations on managed care concerns.23 To date, none has become law.
Though the federal government has instituted some limited regulatory
measures,2 4 it has yet to establish a coherent system for managed care
regulation.
In contrast, state legislatures have responded more rapidly and con-

cretely to public uneasiness with managed care. 26 By 1998, "[v]irtually
all states [had] adopted one or more laws addressing different specific
consumer concerns" about managed care. 27 The myriad of state approaches offer a variety of regulatory models that Congress could
monitor and perhaps revise and adopt.
19. Pew Res. Ctr. for the People & the Press, Compared to 1994, Voters Not So

Angry, Not So Interested, (June 15, 1998) <http://www.people-press.org/
june98rpt.htm> (surveying what news stories are attracting voters' interest and what
issues people consider most important).
20. See The Henry J. Kaiser Family Found., Is There A Managed Care "Back-

lash?," (visited March 7, 2000), <http://kaiser.bitwrench.com/content/archive/1328/
mcarepr.html>.
21. At the time of publication the issue remains unresolved. On October 6, 1999,
the House of Representatives passed H.R. 2990 by a vote of 227 to 205. The Senate
amended the bill by substituting S. 1344 on October 14, 1999.
22. Exec. Order No. 13, 017, 3 C.F.R. 215 (1996).
23. See H.R. 4250, 105th Cong. (1998); H.R. 3605, 105th Cong. (1998).
24. Most notably, a law requiring coverage of forty-eight hour maternity stays.
See Newborns' and Mothers' Health Protection Act of 1996, Pub. L. 104-204, 110 Stat.
2935 (codified at 29 U.S.C. § 1185 (Supp. III 1998)); 42 U.S.C. §§ 300gg-4 (Supp. III
1998); 42 U.S.C. §§ 300gg-51 (Supp. III 1998).
25. The Federal Health Maintenance Organization Act of 1973, 42 U.S.C. § 300e
(1994 & Supp. III 1998), represented an effort by the federal government to facilitate
the development of HMOs. It provided financial subsidies to HMOs, prohibited state
laws or practices that inhibited the formation of federally-qualified HMOs, and required employers with more than 25 employees to offer an HMO as an option in its
health benefits plan. While an HMO must accept several regulatory requirements in
order to enjoy the Act's benefits, the Act does not represent a regulatory scheme
meant to deal with the concerns consumers today have about MCOs. See generally
Troyen A. Brennan & Donald Berwick, NEW RULES: REGULATION, MARKETS, AND
THE QUALITY OF AMERICAN HEALTH CARE 152-54 (1996).
26. See FAMILIES USA FOUND., supra note 11, at 35.
27. Id. at 2; see also Mary Lord, Patiencefor a Bill of Rights: States Begin to Move
on HMO Reforms While Congress Argues, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP. Oct. 5, 1998,
at 74; Andrew Goldstein, Ahead Of The Feds: How Some States Are Already Regulating Managed Care, TIME, July 13, 1998, at 30.
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Perhaps, no state has been more aggressive in its supervision of
MCOs than Texas.2 8 In 1997, the Texas Legislature passed the Texas
Health Care Liability Act (THCLA), 29 directly imposing a legal duty
on MCOs to exercise ordinary care when determining the medical necessity of a patient's proposed treatment.3" A federal district court in
Corporate Health v. Texas Department of Insurance31 recently upheld
Texas' imposition of this duty. It concluded that the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (ERISA) 32 did not preempt the
law's tort liability provision. Prior courts had generally ruled that ERISA preempts state laws that hold employer-sponsored health plans
legally accountable for decisions that ultimately cause patient's harm
by limiting care.3 3
This paper examines Corporate Health and argues the policy wisdom of imposing malpractice liability on MCOs. Part II chronicles the
effective control MCOs exercise over medical care decisions. Part III
discusses states' non-tort regulations of MCOs and their ineffectiveness in making MCOs accountable for that control.
Part IV then argues that the policy behind MCO tort liability makes
sense and that Congress should clearly authorize states to impose malpractice liability on MCOs whose decisions negatively impact patients'
medical treatment. Tort liability forces MCOs to consider the nonmonetary costs of negligent medical necessity decisions borne by man28. Ron Pollack, executive director of Families USA Foundation, a national organization for health care consumers, describes Texas' advancement: "The Texas example is cited frequently because Texas has the most far-reaching legislation ..... "
Carol Marie Cropper, In Texas, a Laboratory Test on the Effects of Suing HMOs, N.Y.
TIMES, Sept. 13, 1998, at A3.
29. TEX. Civ. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 88.001-.003 (Vernon 1997 & Supp.
1999).
30. Only two states-Texas and Missouri-have passed laws exempting managed
care corporations from their laws against suing corporations for malpractice. In both
states, this exemption had the practical effect of imposing tort malpractice liability on
MCOs. Only Texas, however, has taken the additional step of creating a cause of
action so individuals can sue their health plans. See FAMILIES USA FOUND., THE
BEST FROM THE STATES II: THE TEXT OF KEY STATE HMO CONSUMER PROTECTION
PROVISIONS (last visited Nov. 5, 1999) <http://familiesusa.org/best2.htm#sue>; Carla
Rothouse, Insurer Liability, ISSUE PAPER (Health Policy Tracking Serv.), Oct. 1, 1998,
at 3-4. In 1998, eighteen states have considered-but not passed-legislation to allow
medical malpractice suits against MCOs (Alabama, California, Connecticut, Florida,
Georgia, Hawaii, Maine, Maryland, Massachusetts, New Jersey, New York, Ohio,
Oklahoma, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, South Carolina, Washington, and West Virginia). See id.
31. 12 F. Supp. 2d 597 (S.D. Tex. 1998).
32. 29 U.S.C. §§ 1001-1461 (1994).
33. Compare Corcoran v. United Healthcare, Inc., 965 F.2d 1321 (5th Cir. 1992)
and Schmidt v. Kaiser Found. Health Plan, 963 F.Supp. 942 (D. Or. 1997) (both holding that ERISA preempts state tort claims arising from an ERISA MCOs benefit
determinations) with Dukes v. U.S. Healthcare, Inc., 57 F.3d 350 (3d Cir. 1995) and
Kampmeier v. Sacred Heart Hosp., 1996 WL 220979 (E.D. Pa. May 2, 1996) (both
finding no ERISA preemption on claims arising from the provision of medical care as
opposed to coverage administration).
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aged care consumers and then incorporate them into their assessment
of the trade-offs between health care cost and quality.34 It also makes
MCOs respect and adhere to the treatment quality levels demanded
by society. The public has evidenced its desire to contain the rise in
health care costs through its embrace of managed care. Nonetheless,
by society's continued enforcement of standards of care through the
imposition of malpractice liability on physicians and other providers,
it has also revealed the level below which it does not want-and will
not tolerate-health care quality to fall.
Though critics can debate whether custom-based standards of care
make sense35 and whether a tort regime is effective, no reason exists
to exempt MCOs-the decisions of which affect patient care levelsfrom adhering to them while enforcing them against physicians and
other providers.36 Tort liability forces MCOs to respect those levels as
they work to make health care more efficient and will not lead to unreasonable increases in malpractice litigation and health insurance
costs. Part V reflects the recent trends in state legislation to address
accountability and liability of HMOs. Part VI explains the Texas tortbased approach to MCO accountability for medical determinations,
discussing the THCLA and its evaluation in Corporate Health.
Part VII concludes the paper with a call for Congress to enact legislation or amend ERISA so that states can unreservedly enforce medical negligence standards against MCOs. While courts have narrowed
the extent of ERISA's preemption of state law, federal and state decisions on ERISA's implication for state MCO tort liability are inconsistent. Undoubtedly, the resulting uncertainty makes some state
legislatures wary of imposing malpractice liability on MCOs. Clarification from Congress would likely embolden mores states to follow
Texas' lead.

34. For example, the risk of having an illness or injury is exacerbated because of
an MCO's delay or denial of treatment.
35. See Patricia M. Danzon, Tort Liability: A Minefield for Managed Care, 26 J.
LEGAL STUD. 491, 493 (1997) (arguing that "[t]he traditional custom-based standard
of care has no basis in efficiency. On the contrary, it gives legitimacy to the standard
of care that developed under indemnity insurance. Customary care under traditional
insurance reflects severe moral hazard and hence overuse of costly services.").
36. See Peter B. Jurgeleit, Note Physician Employment Under Managed Care: Toward a Retaliatory Discharge Cause of Action for HMO-Affiliated Physicians, 73 IND.
L. 255, 292 (1997). ("Regardless of what HMO protocol holds is medically necessary
or appropriate, a physician's duty of care is nevertheless that which a reasonable physician in the community would have provided.").
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THE DISCONNECT BETWEEN MCO MEDICAL RESPONSIBILITY
AND ACCOUNTABILITY

A.

MCO's Effect on Substantive Medical Care

Managed care began as an effort mainly to improve access to preventive, primary, and coordinated care. 37 Recently, however, the
38
widely perceived need to control America's rising health care costs
has spurred its expansion. Traditional fee-for-service plans offered
powerful incentives for physicians and other providers to provide
costly diagnostic tests, health procedures, and lengthy hospitalizations-even when of questionable benefit to patients. 39 By contrast,
MCOs ideally control health care expenditures by working with physicians to provide only the most cost effective medically appropriate
services. 40 Thus, managed care has the overarching policy goals of reducing wasteful medical treatment while generally promoting efficiency in the nation's health care system.41

However, MCOs' implementation of cost containment measures
impinges on doctor-patient relationships and decisions. This erosion
of the integrity of the physician-patient relationship and decision37. See FAMILIES USA

FOUND.,

supra note 11, at 1. See generally David D. Gri-

ner, Note, Paying the Piper: Third-PartyPayor Liability for Medical Treatment Decisions, 25 GA. L. REV. 861, 874-80 (1991) (giving a brief description of the history of
managed care).
38. See Sally T. Burner & Daniel R. Waldo, National Health Expenditure Projections, 1994-2005, HEALTH CARE FIN. REV., June 1, 1995, at 221. Revised projections
indicate that health expenditures will reach 15.9% of the gross national product by
2000. See id. See generally Jenson, supra note 10 (discussing medical care inflation
compared to general inflation).
39. See FAMILIES USA FOUND., supra note 11, at 1; Danzon, supra note 35, at 494.
"In general, the physician knows more than the patient about the best treatment for the patient's condition and the quality of care actually delivered.
This information asymmetry implies that providers appropriately play a key
role as agents to guide patients in their use of medical services. However,
these same agents/advisors often themselves implement, and therefore have
a financial stake in, the recommended course of treatment."
Id.; see also Griner, supra note 37, at 881. (pointing out that each additional treatment represents extra income for the provider); Kenneth R. Pedroza, Cutting Fat or
Cutting Corners, Health Care Delivery and Its Respondent Effect on Liability, 38 ARIZ.
L. REV. 399, 410 (1996) ("[P]hysicians had an incentive to over-treat the patient. Procedures offering incremental benefits, no matter how small, were undertaken because
both the doctor and the patient received benefits from the treatment.").
40. See Martin F. Shapiro & Neil S. Wenger, Rethinking Utilization Review, 333
NEW ENG. J. MED. 1353, 1353 (1995) (explaining that MCO policies should be employed to increase the cost effectiveness of medical care and optimize quality while
reducing the use of resources); see also FAMILIES USA FOUND., supra note 11, at 1.
41. In aggregate terms, at least, MCOs have succeeded in their goal. "In 1997
national health expenditures amounted to $1.1 trillion, with per capita spending measured just shy of $4,000. Health spending as a share of gross domestic product fell
slightly to 13.5 percent, the smallest claim of health spending on the nation's resources
in the last five years." Health Care Financing Administration, National Health Expenditures, (last updated Oct. 30, 1998) <http://www.hefa.gov/stats/nhe%2Doact/
hilites.htm>.
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making process can affect the quality of patients' care. It overlays external cost and benefit calculations onto medical decisions.42
MCOs attempt to control health care costs by employing various
cost containment policies and systems 43 that purposefully restrict and
effectively control physician behavior. Indeed, managed care differs
from traditional fee-for-service medicine primarily in that physicians
in MCOs do not make independent treatment decisions with their patients. To avoid financing inappropriate medical treatments, MCOs
regularly judge whether health care services prove "medically necessary" in determining patients' coverage. These determinations inject
MCOs into the decision-making process historically reserved for physicians and their patients.4 4
MCOs employ both direct and indirect means to ensure that physician treatment recommendations meet their standards for medical and
financial appropriateness.4 5 MCOs supervise treatment perhaps most
directly through prospective utilization management .4 6 Through utili42. See Robert M. Goldberg, What's Happening to the Healing Process?, WALL
ST. J., June 18, 1997, at A22:
"Many managed care organizations maintain that limiting doctor autonomy
eliminates wide differences in the amount and quality of care. They say that
their systems will integrate care, providing better treatment at a lower cost
than a lonely doctor in a traditional practice can. Several managed care
plans,... have lived up to these claims. But they have taken great pains to
preserve physician's autonomy and to encourage patients to become more
involved in their treatment. Most plans, however, make it harder for doctors
and patients to create such partnerships."
Id. Of course, physicians and other providers had incentives to render more care than
perhaps necessary. These incentives tended to benefit the patient, rarely if ever resulting in a denial or rationing of necessary care. The patient and provider's interests
aligned. By contrast, MCOs have a strong incentive to limit patient care. They, after
all, must pay for it.
43. For an elaborate explanation of the various forms of organizational structures
and cost-containment methods employed by MCOs, see generally, PETER R.
KONGSTVEDT, THE ESSENTIALS OF MANAGED HEALTH CARE (1995) and THOMAS S.
BODENHEIMER

&

KEVIN

GRUMBACH,

UNDERSTANDING

HEALTH

POLICY:

A

(1995).
44. Robert Blendon, professor of health policy and management at the Harvard
School of Public Health, describes the interference: "All these plans have within
them the phrase 'medically necessary and appropriate care.' Nobody told people that
what that meant was their doctor might want to do something and the plan wouldn't
permit it." Susan Brink & Nancy Shute, America's Top HMOs, US NEWS & WORLD
REP., Oct. 13, 1997, at 60.
45. A defined benefits package generally has a central administration that oversees physicians who have contracted with the organization, disburses payment, and
conducts utilization review. Additionally, an MCO may employ gatekeeper physicians-primary care physicians responsible for referring patients to specialists when
necessary. See WILLIAM M. MERCER, INC., INTEGRATED HEALTH PLANS: MANAGED
CLINICAL APPROACH

CARE IN THE 90s 4

(1990).

46. "Utilization review is arguably the measure that presents the greatest intrusion
on provider autonomy. This measure subjects providers' proposed treatments to review before such services can be rendered to patients." Suzanne M. Grosso, Rethinking Malpractice Liability and ERISA Preemption in the Age of Managed Care, 9 STAN.
L. & POL'Y REV. 433, 435 (1998). Another commentator has noted:
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zation review, an MCO pre-screens major physician treatment decisions, retaining the power to authorize or deny payment for services
such as hospital admissions, surgeries, referrals to specialists, and significant medical tests.
Similar to utilization review, MCOs have also designed and imple-

mented treatment conventions and guidelines that outline approved
medical services for various patient conditions.47 For determining
what constitutes medically appropriate and necessary care, most
MCOs have established standards based on clinical information.48
Authorization of treatment or inclusion of a procedure on guidelines

depends not only on whether the MCO's health benefit plan covers a
particular treatment but, more significantly, on whether the treatment
meets 4the
MCO's standard of "medically appropriate and necessary
9
care."

This latter determination essentially shifts the medical decisionmaking authority from the physician to the MCO. 50 The transfer of
decision-making authority to the MCO can prove beneficial since
MCOs, unlike most individual physicians, often have more accumulated experiential data from which to draw. Smart utilization review
decisions and "carefully constructed guidelines.., can [both] decrease
costs and reduce [both] illnesses and deaths."5 1
II.

PHYSICIAN COMPLAINTS

"Managed care physicians argue that [MCO] guidelines are often
applied too rigidly, without consideration for the individual needs of

patients.""2 They also criticize the quality of MCO reviewers, conUtilization review, particularly prospective.., review, strikes at the heart of
health care delivery: the physician-patient relationship. Because the basic
purpose of utilization review is to influence treatment decisions, by its very
nature it must affect or even overrule the physician's decisions.
Griner, supra note 37, at 885.
47. See Danzon, supra note 35, at 498.
48. See FAMILIES USA FOUND., supra note 11, at 28.

49. See id. at 27.
50. During Commerce Committee testimony in 1996, Dr. Linda Peeno, a former
HMO medical reviewer, described the medical necessity determination as a health
plan's "smart bomb capability." By retaining power to define what is and what is not
medically appropriate, a plan can control health decision-making. Memorandum
from Greg Ganske, Rep. of Iowa, U.S. House of Representatives, to Interested Members of Congress (July 21, 1998) (on file with author).
51. Id. For example, two cardiologists at the Minneapolis Heart Institute developed a protocol to determine which patients with chest pains should receive an angiogram-an expensive diagnostic procedure to detect coronary artery disease. By
applying these standards, the physicians cut the number of unnecessary angiograms
by more than 50%, saving about $2.1 million annually and lessening patients' exposure to unnecessary surgical risks. See generally Ron Winslow, Heal Thyself: Two Doctors Saw That If They Were Going To Be More Efficient, They Were Better Doing It
Themselves, WALL ST. J., Oct. 23, 1997, at R15.
52. FAMILIES USA FOUND., supra note 11, at 30. Researchers found that, according to utilization review criteria, 80% of the reviewed cases did not warrant tube in-
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tending that the reviewers sometimes have neither the requisite expertise nor sufficiently complete knowledge of the particular
circumstances to make an appropriate medical judgment.5 3 Furthermore, MCOs have an incentive to mask financial determinations as
medical judgments.5 4
Regardless, when utilization review guidelines apply, the MCOnot the physician-makes the ultimate judgment on the care the patient receives. By assessing a physician's medical judgment for reimbursement purposes, MCOs effectively override doctor and patient
decisions. The majority of patients often will-or must-refuse any
treatment for which their benefit plan will not pay.
MCOs also constrain physician medical decisions in less direct ways.
For instance, MCO payment methods and financial incentives induce
physicians to minimize-sometimes sub-optimally-the care rendered
to patients. 6 Capitation5 7 payment plans provide physicians a flat fee
for each patient regardless of the medical care needed by the patient
and rendered by the physician. This disbursement scheme imposes
upon physicians some financial risk for their treatment of patients.
sertions. By contrast, physicians with substantial expertise in the area concluded that
only 31 percent of the tube insertions would prove unwarranted. U.R. CriteriaFound
Much Stricter Than Physician Review, MEDICAL UTILIZATION MGMT, Aug. 14, 1997,
at 5.
53. See FAMILIES USA FOUND., supra note 11, at 30. Michael DeBakey, M.D., the
pioneering heart surgeon, has lamented:
If Americans want medicine to remain a humanitarian venture, they must be
free to choose their physicians and must insist that health care decisions be
made only by those medically qualified and personally familiar with the patient's clinical condition. We would not allow an unqualified clerk to recommend repairs for our car, so why would we settle for one when it comes to
our own health?
Rx for the Health Care System, WALL ST. J., Oct. 8, 1998, at A18.
Both managed care consumers and providers have also lamented the time and effort
involved in obtaining a utilization review decision. Additionally, patients have had
difficulty obtaining the information they need on how a plan treats a particular disease or the clinical guidelines upon which an adverse utilization review decision rests.
54. See id. Arguably all MCO decisions are reduced to purely financial considerations. One HMO executive described MCO's views of patients as follows:
We see people as numbers, not patients. It's easier to make a decision. Just
like [automobile manufacturers], we're a mass production medical assembly
line, and there is no room for the human equation in our bottom line. Profits are king.
Goldberg, supra note 42, at A22.
55. See Grosso, supra note 46, at 435 (fearing that "a majority of patients will
refuse any treatment that is not covered under a benefits plan."); see also Danzon,
supra note 35, at 498 (noting that "[i]n practice ... insurance coverage may be necessary for the patient to afford high cost care").
56. See FAMILIES USA FOUND., supra note 11, at 16.
57. Capitation generally involves a fixed fee prepaid to physicians for each member in the plan, regardless of the volume or degree of services used. The MCO may
also use incentive plans, in which physicians may receive bonuses for frugal use of
resources; alternatively, they may have part of their salary withheld for excessive use
of services.
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When physicians assume this risk, they effectively act as both care
providers and insurers. Therefore, they have a financial incentive to
provide minimal care because they receive the same revenue irrespective of the time they spend and the expense they incur in rendering
care.58 In effect, withholding care increases the residual doctors can
keep.
In addition to capitation, MCOs often employ other financial incentives and disincentives to encourage reduced care. Incentives include
bonuses for physicians that keep certain medical service utilization below a certain level,59 including, for example, specialist referrals, hospital admissions, and diagnostic tests.6"
Disincentives include
withholding a portion of a physician's reimbursement and deducting
the cost of non-basic medical care.61 MCOs' "use of financial incentive arrangements to pressure physicians into keeping costs at a minimum ... undoubtedly present conflicts of interests [among] patients,
physicians, and payers."62 Recently, the Texas Attorney General filed
suit against several Texas MCOs alleging they illegally rewarded doctors who limited patient medical care and penalized those who did
not.63
In addition to financial incentives and disincentives, MCOs sometimes employ non-financial mechanisms that affect physicians' medical judgment. So-called "gag-rules" restrict a physician's
communication to and on behalf of patients. 64 Through these contrac58. See Parise, supra note 3, at 988 (stating that methods of physician payment
have significant effects on rate of patient hospitalization); see also Danzon, supra note
35, at 499 (noting that "[wihen the provider is paid a fixed amount per patient or
episode, ordering extra services or tests entails additional costs but generates no additional revenue."). See generally Alan L. Hillman et al., How Do FinancialIncentives
Affect Physicians' Clinical Decisions and the FinancialPerformance of Health Maintenance Organizations, 321 NEW ENG. J. MED. 86 (1989); Paul J. Feldstein et al., The
Effects of Utilization Review Programs on Health Care Use and Expenditures, 318
NEW ENG. J. MED., 1310 (1988).
59. See FAMILIES USA FOUND., supra note 11, at 16.
60. See Paul Gray, Gagging the Doctors, TIME, Jan. 8, 1996, at 50 (printing examples taken from U.S. Healthcare's own documents). Based on 925 patients, if a physician's referrals-to-specialists average less than $14.49 per month, per patient, the
physician gets a bonus of $1,323 for the month; if the costs rise above $30.49 per
patient, the doctor gets nothing extra. See id. If all of the doctor's patients collectively
average fewer than 178 days in the hospital per year, the doctor receives a bonus of
$2,063 per month; if patients collectively stay more than 363 days, the doctor receives
nothing. See id.
61. For example, if a primary care physician is to receive a capitated rate of $11.25
per month, per patient, the MCO may withhold 20% or $2.25 per month, place that
money in reserve, use that money to pay for non-basic medical treatment for all of the
physician's patients, and at year's end give the physician whatever money remains.
See KONGSTVEDT, supra note 43, at 79.
62. Parise, supra note 3, at 989.
63. Laura Goldberg, Texas Sues HMOs, Claims Conflict of Interest in Care, HousTON CHRON., Dec. 17, 1998, available in 1998 WL 16788133.
64. See FAMILIES USA FOUND., supra note 11, at 16. Such restrictions have been
generically called "gag" rules. See Robert Pear, Word for Word? HMO Contracts:
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tual provisions, a plan may enforce-explicitly or implicitly-practices
that prohibit or discourage physicians from fully explaining to patients
more costly treatment options, a health plan's utilization policies, and
the financial incentive structures of the plan for the physician. Some
MCOs may even terminate doctors who advocate on behalf of their
patients against treatment denials.65
Through indirect controls such as fixed payment methods, financial
incentives, and "gag clauses," MCOs may not actually determine the

specific medical treatment rendered to a patient. Nonetheless, these
mechanisms restrict the options which a physician will consider or discuss with a patient ultimately impacting the level of medical care received by the patient. Together with direct utilization review and
clinical protocols, these indirect influences enable MCOs to determine
effectively and substantively the care rendered to patients. Using such
measures, MCOs "control the .. .what, when, where, and how of

medical treatment."66 As a Pennsylvania court recently observed,
MCOs "involve themselves daily in decisions involving their subscriber's medical care." 67

III.

STATES' NON-TORT REGULATION

Managed care's success in curtailing the rise in national healthcare

expenditures has proven unsettling for consumers. 68 "Many fear that
The Tricky Business of Keeping Doctors Quiet, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 22, 1996, at D7. The
U.S. General Accounting Office found little evidence of explicit gag rules in a review
of HMO provider contracts. U.S. GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, GAO/HEHS-97175, MANAGED CARE: EXPLICIT GAG CLAUSES NOT FOUND IN HMO CONTRACTS,
BUT PHYSICIAN CONCERNS REMAIN

(1997). The GAO noted, however, that managed

care plans may influence physician behavior through their ability to terminate contracts with physicians: "Physicians... pointed out that the increasing power of HMOs
in the health care marketplace and their ability to bear on physicians to modify their
practice patterns or discussions with patients, without relying on [gag] clauses." Id.
Also, "two-thirds of responding plans and 60 percent of the contracts submitted had a
non-disparagement, non-solicitation, or confidentiality clause that could be interpreted by physicians as limiting communication about all treatment options." Id.
65. See John P. Little, Note, Managed Care Contracts of Adhesion: Terminating the
Doctor-Patient Relationship and Endangering Patient Health, 49 RUTGERS L. REV.
1397, 1443 (Summer 1997) (arguing that "[tjhere are no other purposes for termination without cause clauses other than coercing physicians into restricting patient care
and terminating those physicians whom the MCO considers to be non-compliant.")
66. David Sibley, What the Texas Experiment Shows About H. .M.O. Liability,
N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 7, 1998, at A21. ("They decide who your doctor will be, what treatment you will receive, when you will receive it, where it will be delivered, and how it
will be delivered."). Regarding the "who your doctor will be" decision, managed care
plans generally restrict coverage to a network of contracted preferred providers. See
Danzon, supra note 35, at 498.
67. Shannon v. McNulty, 718 A.2d 828, 835 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1998). The court held
that the parents of a child that died following premature delivery made a prima facie
case against their HMO for both vicarious liability and direct liability. See id. The
court also noted that "[a] great deal of today's healthcare is channeled through HMOs
with the subscribers being given little or no say in the stewardship of their care." Id.
68. See FAMILIES USA FOUND., supra note 11, at 1.

Published by Texas A&M Law Scholarship, 2022

13

Texas Wesleyan Law Review, Vol. 6 [2022], Iss. 1, Art. 4

TEXAS WESLEYAN LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 6

the reversal of economic incentives [from the fee-for-service system]
will result in the denial of needed and appropriate care.

' 69

Stories of

problems "ranging in severity from time-consuming bureaucratic red
tape to life-threatening"7 refusals of treatment have compounded
consumer anxiety.7 Accordingly, many state legislatures have passed

regulations for MCOs.72 By October 1998, most states enacted regulations that attempted either to preserve the integrity of the physicianpatient relationship or to increase patient access to services, such as
emergency care, prescription drugs, and specialists.73

Several types of state regulations aim to lessen MCO interference
with the doctor-patient relationship."

These mandates seek to mini-

mize business and financial considerations in a doctor and patient's
medical treatment decisions rather than imposing any affirmative substantive medical obligations on MCOs. Thus, the regulations implicitly assume that if physicians and patients can interact as
independently as possible, quality of care will meet or exceed society's

custom-based standards. The most common non-interference regulations established by states include safeguards of doctor-patient communications, prohibitions against health plans' use of financial

incentives to limit health care, and specifications of procedures
through which patients can appeal denials of care by MCOs.75

69. Id. A recent survey by The Henry J. Kaiser Foundation and Harvard University's School of Public Health (Nov. 5, 1997) found that a majority of Americans
(59%) believe managed care plans make it harder for sick people to see specialists.
Over half of those surveyed (51%) say managed care has hurt the quality of care for
sick individuals. See The Henry J. Kaiser Family Found., Is There A Managed Care
"Backlash?," (visited March 7, 2000) <http://kaiser.bitwrench.com/content/archive/
1328/mcarepr.html>.
70. FAMILIES USA FOUND., supra note 11, at 1.
71. See supra notes 1.4-15 and accompanying text.
72. See FAMILIES USA FOUND., supra note 11, at 25. See also Milt Freudenheim,
HMOs Cope With a Backlash on Cost Cutting, N.Y. TIMES, May 19, 1996, at Al (stating [o]ver the last 18 months, at least 34 states have outlawed or curtailed methods
that many health maintenance organizations have used to restrict patient care).
73. See FAMILIES USA FOUND., supra note 11, at 30.
74. See generally FAMILIES USA FOUND., supra note 11.
75. Other state regulations also work to maintain the integrity of the doctor-patient relationship and to shield doctors and patient medical decisions from MCO pressure. For example, more than one forth of states give seriously ill patients and
pregnant women the right to continue receiving reimbursed care for a specified period of time from a physician whom an MCO has dropped. See FAMILIES USA
FOUND., supra note 30, at 9-10. See, e.g., N.J. ADMIN. CODE tit. 8 § 38-3.5(a)(4)
(1997). These laws ensure that MCOs cannot arbitrarily disrupt the doctor-patient
relationship. Also, two states-Maryland and Rhode Island-have enacted laws that
prevent health plans from prohibiting patient participation in clinical trials if a doctor
thinks the participation will help. See 1998 MD. LAws § 1 (S. 137); R.I. GEN. LAWS
§ 27-41.2 (Supp. 1997).
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A.

Anti-Gag Clauses

Most states 76 have passed "anti-gag clause" measures designed to
prevent MCOs from interfering with certain communications between
doctors and their patients. These regulations respond to provisions
contained in some contracts between MCOs and providers that limit
the subjects that physicians may discuss with patients.7 7 Most prohibit
health plans from penalizing doctors for discussing more expensive
treatment options with patients or for disclosing the plan's utilization
policies and financial incentive structure as they relate to the patient.78
In addition, some states have passed laws that specifically prevent
health plans from terminating or refusing to renew provider contracts
solely because physicians advocate on behalf of their patients, filed
complaints against a plan, appealed a plan decision, or requested a
hearing or review. 79 Kansas, for example, has established both types
of prohibitions. 81 These "anti-gag clause" measures attempt to minimize corporate factors from influencing doctor-patient communication and to align the physician more squarely with the patient than
with the MCO.
B.

Prohibiting FinancialIncentives

Nearly two out of every five states 81 have passed legislation to ensure that physician financial incentives do not adversely affect patient
care.8 2 Provisions of these laws vary. Some are quite vague, simply
prohibiting plans from using financial incentives that will result in a
denial of medically necessary care. Others have more specific and expansive statutes. One statute prohibits plans from making "specific
payments directly or indirectly to the provider as an inducement or
incentive to reduce or limit services, to reduce the length of stay or the
76. Alaska, Arizona, Arkansas, California, Colorado, Connecticut, Delaware, the
District of Columbia, Florida, Georgia, Hawaii, Idaho, Indiana, Iowa, Kansas, Kentucky, Louisiana, Maine, Maryland, Massachusetts, Michigan, Minnesota, Missouri,
Montana, Nebraska, Nevada, New Hampshire, New Jersey, New Mexico, New York,
North Carolina, North Dakota, Ohio, Oklahoma, Oregon, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, Tennessee, Texas, Utah, Vermont, Virginia, Washington, West Virginia, Wisconsin, and Wyoming. See FAMILIES USA FOUND., supra note 11, at 25.
77. See supra notes 64-65 and accompanying text.
78. See FAMILIES USA FOUND., supra note 11, at 25.
79. See, e.g., N.J. STAT. ANN. § 34-19-3 (West Supp. 1999); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 2741-46 (1998).
80. See FAMILIES USA FOUND., supra note 11, at 20 tbl.1; see also KAN. STAT.
ANN. § 40-4604 (Supp. 1998).
81. Nineteen states have: Alaska, California, Georgia, Idaho, Kansas, Louisiana,
Maryland, Montana, Nebraska, Nevada, New Jersey, New Mexico, Ohio, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, Texas, Utah, Vermont, and West Virginia. See FAMILIES USA
FOUND., supra note 11, at 25.
82. See supra notes 57-63 and accompanying text.
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use of alternative treatment settings, or the use of a particular medication with respect to an individual patient ....
C. Regulatory Procedures

In addition to statutory prohibitions, many states have created regulatory procedures to ensure that patients and providers receive due

process in their interactions with MCOs. In particular, some states
have mandated that MCOs establish or strengthen grievance and appeal procedures .84 Some new protections entail notice requirements
and time lines for resolution of non-urgent claims,8 5 mandatory expethe righttoto
dited review of decisions affecting emergency care, 86 and th
87
file grievances orally. Some regulations attempt to inject independence into the appeal process by requiring either internal MCO review by professional peers not associated with the original care
denial88 or external review by a qualified independent decisionmaker.89 About one in three states 9° have taken the latter approach,

permitting consumers to appeal to an external expert panel independent of the health plan. These appellate procedures further the integ-

rity of the physician-patient relationship by trying to ensure that
treatment denials rest on considered medical judgment rather than
business caprice.
D.

Substantive Medical Obligations

In addition to measures that work to minimize external MCO interference with the traditional physician-patient relationship, some states
83. R.I. GEN. LAWS § 23-17.13-3(B)(8) (1996).
84. Arizona, Connecticut, Florida, Hawaii, Maryland, Michigan, Minnesota, Missouri, New Jersey, New Mexico, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, Tennessee, Texas, and
Vermont have adopted meaningful independent external review processes for managed care consumers. See FAMILIES USA FOUND., supra note 11, at 13.
85. Particularly, "protective laws require plans to respond to appeals for non-urgent care within a specified time frame. Texas, for instance, allows only 30 days for
acknowledgment, investigation, and resolution of a complaint after an MCO receives
the complaint." FAMILIES USA FOUND., supra note 11, at 12; see also TEX. INS. CODE
ANN. art. 20A.12(d) (Vernon Supp. 1999).
86. "Most states have required an expedited appeals procedure for emergency and
urgent care situations." FAMILIES USA FOUND., supra note 30, at 12. The specificity
of their time frames vary, with some simply vaguely referring to the need for expedited review. Others give specific times. See, e.g., NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 695G.210
(Michie 1997) (requiring 72-hour turn-around); 1998 MD. CODE ANN., INS. § 15-10A2(b)(2)(i) (Supp. 1999) (requiring 24-hour turn-around).
87. See IND. CODE ANN. §27-13-10-5 (Supp. 1998); see also FAMILIES USA
FOUND., supra note 11, at 13 ("An enrollee or a subscriber may file a grievance orally
or in writing.") Other states mandate that MCOs must treat oral complaints about
denials, reductions, and terminations as beginning the appellate process. See id.
88. See, e.g., VA. CODE ANN. § 32.1-137.15 (Michie 1999).
89. See, e.g., VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 8, § 4089f (Supp. 1998).
90. Fifteen have: Arizona, Connecticut, Florida, Hawaii, Maryland, Michigan,
Minnesota, Missouri, New Jersey, New Mexico, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, Tennessee, Texas, and Vermont. See FAMILIES USA FOUND., supra note 11, at 25.
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have imposed substantive medical obligations on MCOs. These states
require that MCOs provide consumers access to specified services.
Almost three-fifths of all the states 91 have passed laws establishing the
right of patients to go to an emergency room and have the MCO pay
for the resulting care if the person reasonably believed she had an
emergency. 92 Nearly one-third of all the states 93 have entitled patients
to receive reimbursement for health care from an out-of-network provider when a health plan's network proves inadequate. 94 About onefifth of the states95 have also required that persons with a chronic or
serious illness or disability have the option of retaining a specialist as
their primary care provider. 96 Some states 97 allow seriously ill persons
to obtain standing referrals to a specialist, 98 while others9 9 give women
guaranteed direct access to an obstetrician or gynecologist.1 "' Almost
one in six states' have required MCOs to establish procedures that
enable patients to obtain specific prescription drugs that are not on 0 a2
health plan's formulary without bearing additional financial cost.
91. Thirty-three have laws establishing a version of the "prudent lay-person" standard: Arkansas, California, Colorado, Connecticut, the District of Columbia, Georgia, Hawaii, Idaho, Indiana, Iowa, Kentucky, Louisiana, Maine, Maryland, Michigan,
Minnesota, Missouri, Nebraska, Nevada, New Mexico, New York, North Carolina,
Ohio, Oregon, Pennsylvania, South Carolina, Texas, Vermont, Virginia, Washington,
West Virginia, and Wisconsin. See FAMILIES USA FOUND., supra note 11, at 23.
92. See, e.g., GA. CODE ANN. § 31-11-82 (Supp. 1999). See also FAMILIES USA
FOUND., supra note 30, at 2.
93. Colorado, Florida, Indiana, Kentucky, Maine, Missouri, Montana, New Mexico, New York, North Carolina, Ohio, Tennessee, Texas, Utah, and Vermont. See
FAMILIES USA FOUND., supra note 11, at 23-24.
94. See, e.g., CODE ME. R. CH. 850 § 7(A) (1997); 1998 Colo. Sess. Laws, § 10-16704(2); see also FAMILIES USA FOUND., supra note 30, at 4, 6.
95. Indiana, Missouri, New Jersey, New Mexico, New York, Ohio, Pennsylvania,
Tennessee, Texas, and Vermont. See FAMILIES USA FOUND., supra note 11, at 24.
96. See, e.g., N.Y. INS. LAW § 4804(c) (Consol. Supp. 1999); see also FAMILIES
USA FOUND., supra note 30, at 6-7.
97. Alabama, California, Florida, Kansas, Minnesota, Missouri, New Mexico, New
York, Ohio, Pennsylvania, Tennessee, and Vermont. See FAMILIES USA FOUND.,
supra note 11, at 24.
98. See, e.g., OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 1753.14(A) (Anderson Supp.1998); see also
FAMILIES USA FOUND., supra note 30, at 7-8.
99. States requiring that women have direct access to obstetricians and gynecologists include: Alabama, Arkansas, California, Colorado, Connecticut, Delaware, Florida, Georgia, Idaho, Illinois, Indiana, Kentucky, Louisiana, Minnesota, Mississippi,
Montana, Nebraska, New Jersey, New Mexico, New York, North Carolina, Oregon,
Pennsylvania, South Carolina, Tennessee, Texas, Vermont, Virginia, Washington, and
West Virginia. This list excludes states requiring access for only one annual visit. See
FAMILIES USA FOUND., supra note 11, at 24.
100. See, e.g., ALA. CODE § 27-49-4 (Supp. 1997); see also FAMILIES USA FOUND.,
supra note 30, at 8-9.
101. Arkansas, California, Georgia, Indiana, Missouri, Ohio, Oregon, and Vermont. See FAMILIES USA FOUND., supra note 11, at 24-25. This list excludes states
that do not require plans to establish procedures for obtaining non-formulary drugs
but do require procedures be disclosed if in place. See id.
102. See, e.g., ARK. CODE ANN. § 23-99-409 (Michie Supp. 1997); see also FAMILIES
USA FOUND., supra note 30, at 11-12.
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These substantive access mandates have mitigated some of the more
deleterious impacts managed care has had on health service quality.
IV.

INADEQUACY OF NON-TORT REGULATION

A.

Mitigating Factors

Non-tort regulations, however, do not adequately make MCOs accountable for the medical decisions they effectively make. Anti-gag
clause measures, prohibitions of certain physician incentives, and substantive access mandates attempt to mitigate MCO influence over
care decisions thereby obviating the need for MCO accountability for
those decisions. Anti-gag measures and incentive prohibitions free
doctors and patients to consider a broader set of treatment options.
Access laws give patients the right to certain medical services, irrespective of MCO policies.
To the extent that such mandates reduce the influence of MCOs in
medical treatment decisions, they undermine-or at least dampenthe efficiency and cost reduction efforts that have made managed care
popular with employers and policy-makers. Reducing MCO's sway
over the doctor-patient relationship and their checks on access to
costly services lessens the ability of MCOs to contain health care
costs. Care-quality regulations on MCOs must enable managed care
to limit unnecessary and inappropriate medical treatments. Non-interference and mandatory access statutes do not fit such criteria. Such
quality-targeted mandates that remove MCOs' ability to assess the
medical necessity and propriety of service options go too far.
Additionally, anti-gag clause measures, prohibitions on certain physician incentives, and substantive access mandates fail to fully eradicate MCOs from care determinations. Capitation payment structures
and the mere threat of removal from a health plan's network strongly
encourage physicians to comply with explicit and implicit medical and
financial norms established by an MCO. Though limitations may exist
on MCOs' power over care decisions under these non-tort regulations, they still have no accountability for how they exert that lessened
power.
B.

Lengthy Appeals Process

Appellate procedure mandates likewise fail to make MCOs sufficiently accountable for their control over medical decisions. Too
often, appeal procedures prove inadequate. Enrollees may not know
their rights. Plans may fail to inform them in writing that they can
appeal denials, reductions, and terminations of care.1 °3 Moreover, appeal processes can prove cumbersome and require weeks, if not
103. With tort liability, plaintiff's lawyers will have an incentive to inform harmed
consumers of their rights.
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months, to reach resolution. The perceived likelihood of frustration
and a long wait might discourage enrollees from even bothering to
begin the process. 10 4 Moreover, long appellate procedures can endanger the health and even the lives of patients with urgent medical concerns. Furthermore, experts with sufficient understanding of the
medical issues and particular circumstances at hand may not participate in the decision-making process. 0 5 Additionally, because the
MCOs often govern the internal appeal processes 10 6 and can capture,10 7 or at least strongly affect, bureaucratic review procedures,
consumers may have no confidence in the fairness of the appeal
process.
Perhaps most disturbingly, non-tort appeal processes-whether external or internal-generally under-deter MCOs from authorizing customary care. They offer consumers no recourse other than direct
performance of the treatment. Financially, at least, MCOs still have
incentive to withhold medical services before rendering them, resulting in patients enduring long appeals. The lack of punitive damages
under-deters MCOs because MCOs would not have to pay for the
care needed by those patients who choose to forego the trouble of
appealing." 8 Also, non-tort appeal processes provide no remedy for
consumers who have already suffered further injury or illness from an
MCO's negligence in denying care. Non-tort processes fail to sufficiently encourage MCOs to authorize the level of care that society
demands and enforces through its malpractice liability laws.
Physicians and other providers should not bear the burden of upholding custom-based medical standards alone. Non-interference, access, and appeal regulations all fall short of spreading the burden.
Legislatures should place substantive medical responsibilities on
MCOs that reflect the organizations' direct and controlling role in the
provision and determination of health care services.
104. Similar reasons may make consumers reluctant to use the tort process. That
process, however, will give them recourse other than direct performance (e.g., compensatory or punitive damages).
105. The adversary process would ensure the introduction of the relevant expertise
and information into a malpractice proceeding.
106. See Bennett Roth, Senate GOP Health Care Bill Unveiled, HOUSTON CHRON.,
July 16, 1998, at Al ("There have also been questions about the impartiality of the...
appeals, since the medical expert who would hear the case would be appointed and
paid for by the health plan.").
107. "Theorists have reasoned that capture arises because [MCO] interests are concentrated, intense, and hence tend toward effective group action whereas consumer
interests are dispersed, individually weak, and plagued by free rider obstacles to mutual action." John S. Wiley Jr., A Capture Theory of Antitrust Federalism, 99 HARV. L.
REV.

713, 732 (1986).

108. See generally A. Mitchell Polinsky and Steven Shavell, Punitive Damages: An
Economic Analysis, 111 HARV. L. REV. 869, 887-96 (1998) (arguing that if a defendant can sometimes escape liability for the harm for which he is responsible, the proper
magnitude of damages is the harm the defendant has caused, multiplied by a factor
reflecting the probability of his escaping liability).
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GOVERNMENTAL RESPONSE

Recognizing the indirect and insufficient accountability imposed by
non-tort regulations, Texas and other states have begun to attempt to
hold MCOs explicitly accountable for their medical determinations
through tort actions. They have passed statutes that invalidate holdharmless clauses and directly subject MCOs to tort malpractice liability. Several states, including Texas, have prohibited the use of indemnification clauses between MCOs and health care providers. These
clauses in MCO-physician contracts require the physician to assume

the liability inherent in medical decision-making, relieving MCOs of
responsibility. In 1995, Connecticut, 10 9 Oregon, 11° and New Hampshire... became the first states to void such provisions.' 1 2 Maryland,113 Virginia,4 Rhode Island,' 1 5 and New York" 6 followed with

similar prohibitions in 1996.117 By 1998, Texas and twelve other states
also enacted measures invalidating hold-harmless clauses in provider
contracts.11 8
Additionally, numerous states-with Texas having progressed the

furthest-have considered directly providing consumers civil malprac-

tice rights against MCOs." 9 In 1996, Governor Lawton Chiles vetoed
legislation that would have made Florida the first state to allow malpractice suits against MCOs. 120 Twenty other states debated similar
legislation in 1997.121 By 1998, twenty-nine states had
introduced bills
22
allowing a patient to sue an MCO for malpractice.1
As of October 1998, only Missouri and Texas had actually enacted
laws permitting consumer malpractice suits against MCOs. 123 Mis109. See CONN. GEN. STAT. § 38a-472a (Supp. 1999).
110. See OR. REV. STAT. § 743.803 (1999).
111. See N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 420-c:5-a (Supp. 1996).
112. See Rothouse, supra note 30, at 1.
113. See MD. CODE ANN., INS. § 15-117 (1997).
114. See VA. CODE ANN. § 38.3-5402 (Supp.1997).
115. See R.I. GEN. LAWS § 23-17.13-3(B)(8) (1997).
116. See N.Y. PUBLIC HEALTH LAW § 4324 (Supp. 1998).
117. See Rothouse, supra note 30, at 1-2.
118. The other states include Vermont, Louisiana, Missouri, North Dakota, South
Carolina, Tennessee. As of October, 25 states had introduced hold-harmless bills in
1998. See Rothouse, supra note 30, at 2.
119. See FAMILIES USA FOUND., supra note 11, at 19.
120. See Rothouse, supra note 30, at 3.
121. See id. Rhode Island, for example, adopted S 837. That law created a special
Senate commission to study the legal liability of HMOs in cases of inadequate care.
See id.
122. As of October, 1998, California, Colorado, Connecticut, Delaware, Florida,
Georgia, Hawaii, Illinois, Indiana, Iowa, Kentucky, Maryland, Maine, Michigan, Minnesota, New Hampshire, New Jersey, New Mexico, New York, Ohio, Oklahoma,
Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, South Carolina, Tennessee, Vermont, Virginia, Washington, and West Virginia had proposed such measures. See Rothouse, supra note 30, at
4. Bills that would have created malpractice tort accountability for MCOs have officially failed in 19 states. See id.
123. See id. at 3-4.
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souri passed House Bill 335, repealing its corporate practice of
medicine prohibition.1 2 4 This removal implicitly made MCOs accountable for
their medical necessity determinations under a malprac12 5
tice theory.
Prior to Missouri's repeal of its corporate medicine prohibition,
Texas passed the first statute establishing MCO tort accountability
with the passage of the THCLA 2 6 Like the Missouri legislation,1 2 7
the Texas statute prohibits MCOs from claiming the prohibitions
against the corporate practice of medicine as a shield to malpractice
claims.1 2 8
The THCLA goes even further by making MCOs directly susceptible to malpractice claims for their decisions regarding the medical necessity of treatments.1 29 The THCLA explicitly provides that patients
can sue MCOs for malpractice when their health care treatment determinations do not meet the standard of ordinary care. 3 ° Additionally,
the statute provides for an independent review process for MCO denials of care,1 3 prohibits indemnification clauses in MCO-provider con124. See supra note 30 and accompanying text.
125. Insurers have used bars against the corporate practice of medicine to argue
against malpractice suits. They have contended that because a state forbids them to
practice medicine, they cannot have liability for malpractice. The argument strains
logic: "It's like being stopped by a cop for speeding and you say 'Well, officer, I
couldn't possible have been speeding because it's against the law in Texas to speed,'"
says Elizabeth Kilbride, a Houston lawyer. See Cropper, supra note 28, at A3.
126. Codified at TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. §§ 88.001-88.003 (Vernon
Supp. 1999) and TEX. INS. CODE ANN. arts. 20A.09, 20A.12, 20A.12A, 21.58A, 21.58C
(West Supp. 1999). In announcing his decision to let S386 (THCLA) become law sans
his signature, Texas Governor Bush explained: "Given the choice between doing
nothing and doing something to address a significant problem that impacts the health
of thusands of Texans, I have concluded the potential for doing good outweighs the
potential for harm in S386." Wayne J. Guglielmo, Sharp Shootin': Texas Doctors Put
HMOs in the Malpractice Target Zone, MEDICAL ECON., Dec. 22, 1997, at 98.
127. Missouri, too, has exposed MCOs to malpractice claims. Rather than enacting
a law specifically making them susceptible to tort actions, however, Missouri simply
made "it clear that HMOs practice medicine." Jane Bryant Quinn, Holding Health
Plans Accountable, WASH. POST, Sept. 9, 1997, at 56.
128. See TEX. CIv. PRAC. & REM. CODE § 88.002(h) (Vernon 1997).
129. See id. § 88.002(a). This act only involves medical services covered by an
MCO's health care plan. It does not require MCOs to provide services not covered
under its plan. See id. § 88.002(d).
130. While the THCLA imposes liability on MCOs, it specifically exempts employers from liability when they do not participate in MCO care determinations. See id. at
§ 88.002(e). Also, a patient cannot ordinarily bring a liability action unless the patient
has exhausted the internal appeals process of the MCO and the Independent Review
Organization (IRO) mechanism authorized by the THCLA. If the patient has already
suffered harm because of a treatment denial and a review would not benefit the patient, the patient can file suit without proceeding through the MCO appeals and IRO
processes. See id. § 88.003.
131. See id. The legislation provides that a patient has the right to the review of a
denial of medical services by an MCO in front of an IRO. The commissioner of insurance makes the assignment for review and sets the standards for certification. The
review must occur within the earlier of 15 days after the date the IRO receives the
necessary documents for review or 20 days after it receives a request for review.
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tracts, 132 and forbids MCOs to retaliate against physicians and other
providers that advocate on behalf of their patients. 133 In effect, the
statute "recognizes that HMOs make medical decisions and forces
them to answer for those decisions, just like doctors and hospitals.' 1 34
By doing so, it represents "a watershed for state managed-care
accountability.
VI.

THE ROLE OF CORPORA TE HEALTH

Even before the THCLA took effect on September 1, 1997, it met

legal challenge. On June 16, 1997, Aetna Health Plans of Texas 1 3 6
("Aetna") filed suit against the Texas Department of Insurance seeking to have the law invalidated. 3 7 Aetna alleged primarily that the
statute violated ERISA. 38 Aetna claimed that the federal law pre-

empted the state statute's malpractice liability provision, its independent review process mandate, its prohibition of hold-harmless clauses,
and its preclusion of physician termination for patient advocacy. 139
Judge Vanessa Gilmore held that ERISA did not preempt the malpractice liability portion of the statute but did preclude the other
40
provisions.
Judge Gilmore found that ERISA's insurance savings clause 441 did

not except the Texas law from preemption.1 42 Through it's savings
clause, ERISA provides that "nothing in this title shall be construed
to exempt or relieve any person from any law of any State, which regOrdinarily, a patient must first exhaust the internal appeals process of the MCO. In
the event of a life threatening condition, the patient can skip the internal review process of an MCO and appeal directly to an IRO. The IRO review must conclude
within the earlier of 5 days of receiving the necessary documents or 8 days after its
receipt of the request for review. See id. § 88.002.
132. See id. § 88.002(g).
133. See id. § 88.002(f).
134. Sibley, supra note 66, at A21. Sibley has also commented: "The cornerstone
of Senate Bill 386 was simply this: if the HMOs choose to make medical decisionsstand in the shoes of the doctor, as it were-they ought to stand in the shoes of the
doctor in court, too." See Guglielmo, supra note 126, at 90.
135. Carol O'Brien, American Medical Association senior counsel, quoted in Guglielmo, supra note 126, at 89.
136. Along with Corporate Health Insurance, Inc., Aetna Health Plans of North
Texas, Inc., and Aetna Life Insurance Company.
137. Corporate Health Ins., Inc. v. Texas Dep't of Ins., 12 F. Supp. 2d 597, 602 (S.D.
Tex. 1998).
138. See id. at 602. Aetna also claimed that the THCLA violated the Federal
Health Benefit Act (FEHBA) See id. This contention, though, proved minor in the
case. Regarding the FEHBA preemption argument, Judge Gilmore concluded that a
claim addressing the quality of a benefit would not relate to a FEHBA plan. See id. at
630.
139. See id. at 630.
140. See id.
141. See Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974, 29 U.S.C. § 1144
(b)(2)(A) (1994).
142. See Corporate Health, 12 F. Supp. 2d at 597.
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ulates insurance, banking or securities."1'43 The Supreme Court "delineated the requirements that a state statute must meet in order to
come within the insurance facet of the savings clause" in Metropolitan
Life Insurance Co. v. Massachusetts.144 One necessary factor of that
test considers whether the state regulation "is limited to entities
within the insurance industry.' 1 45 Judge Gilmore determined that the
THCLA did not satisfy that requisite prong-and thus failed the Metis obviously not limropolitan Life test-because "on its face, the Act
1' 46
ited to entities within the insurance industry.'
Having determined that the THCLA did not fall within the safe
harbor of ERISA's savings clause, Judge Gilmore then concluded that
the THCLA did not meet the "relates to" test for preemption in ERISA § 514(a) . 4 That section provides that ERISA "shall supersede
any and all State laws insofar as they ... relate to any employee benefit plan....48 Under ERISA preemption analysis, a state law "relates to" an ERISA plan if it "references" or has a "connection with"
such a plan. 49

In making these determinations, the United States Supreme Court
has taken a practical approach. In New York State Conference of Blue
Cross & Blue Shield Plans v. Travelers, 5 ' the Court noted that: "it
must go beyond the unhelpful text [of § 514(a)] and the frustrating
difficulty of defining its key term ["relates to"], and look instead to
the
the objectives of the ERISA statute as a guide to the scope of' 151
state law that Congress understood would survive [preemption]."
The Court asserted that the principle purpose of ERISA's "preemption clause ...

was to avoid a multiplicity of regulation in order to

permit a nationally uniform administration of employee benefit
plans.

'152

Accordingly, the Court found that ERISA's "relate[s] to"

143. 29 U.S.C. § 1144(b)(2)(A).
144. 471 U.S. 724, 741-47 (1985).
145. Id. at 743 (quoting Union Labor Ins. Co. v. Pireno, 458 U.S. 119, 129 (1982)).
The savings clause test adopted in Metropolitan Life has been described as follows:
First, the [C]ourt determined whether the statute in question fitted the common sense definition of insurance regulation. Second, it looked at three factors: (1)[w]hether the practice (the statute) has the effect of spreading
policyholders' risk; (2) whether the practice is an integral part of the policy
relationship between the insurer and the insured; and (3) whether the practice is limited to entities within the insurance industry. If the statute fitted
the common sense definition of insurance regulation and the court answered
"yes" to each of the questions in the three part test, then the statute fell
within the savings clause exempting it from ERISA preemption.
Tingle v. Pacific Mut. Ins. Co., 996 F.2d 105, 107 (5th Cir. 1993).
146. Corporate Health, 12 F. Supp. 2d at 607 (internal quotations omitted).
147. 29 U.S.C. § 1144(a).
148. Id. (emphasis added).
149. Shaw v. Delta Air Lines, Inc., 463 U.S. 85, 96-97 (1983).
150. 514 U.S. 645 (1995).
151. Id. at 656.
152. Id. at 657.
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language was not "intended to modify 'the starting presumption that
Congress does not intend to supplant state law"' that falls within areas
of traditional state regulation.1 53 Those areas include "matters of
'
health and safety."154
Regarding the "reference" assessment, the U.S.
Supreme Court has ruled that it is only "[w]here a State's law acts
immediately and exclusively upon ERISA plans . . . or where the
existence of ERISA plans is essential to the law's operation ... that
'reference' will result in preemption."1 5' 5
Judge Gilmore concluded that the THLCA did not suffer "reference" preemption. Aetna had argued that although the statute does
not specifically refer to ERISA plans, certain statutory terminology
such as "health care plan" and "health maintenance organization"
warrants ERISA preemption. However, Judge Gilmore found that
"the existence of an ERISA plan is not essential to the operation of
the Act."' 56 The statute does not "work immediately and exclusively
upon ERISA plans."15' 7 Rather, the Texas law simply places a standard of ordinary care on health insurance carriers and MCOs regardless of whether their coverage occurs in an ERISA plan.'5 8
Accordingly, Judge Gilmore found that the THCLA "cannot be said
to make a reference to ERISA plans in any manner. "159
Judge Gilmore next examined whether the Texas law met the "connection with" ERISA test. 6 ' If a state statute has a "connection61
with" ERISA, the federal law may still preempt its application.1
Aetna posited that the THCLA had several "connections with" ERISA, including the imposition of state liability laws on ERISA entities. 162 To support its claim, Aetna referenced Corcoran v. United
HealthcareInc.163 In that case, the Fifth Circuit held that ERISA preempted a Louisiana tort action against an MCO for the wrongful
death of an unborn child. 1 64 The court based its holding on the con153. De Buono v. NYSA-ILA Med. & Clinical Servs. Fund, 117 S.Ct. 1747, 1751
(1997).
154. Id. at 1751-52.
155. California Div. of Labor Standards Enforcement v. Dillingham, 519 U.S. 316,
325 (1997).
156. Corporate Health Ins., Inc. v. Texas Dep't of Ins., 12 F. Supp. 2d 597, 614 (S.D.
Tex. 1998).
157. Id.
158. See id. at 612.
159. Id.
160. See id. The "connection with" test has been stated as: "To determine whether
a state law has the forbidden connection, [a court must look].., both to the objectives
of the ERISA statute as a guide to the scope of the state law that Congress understood would survive as well as to the nature of the effect of the state law on ERISA
plans." Dillingham, 519 U.S. at 325 (quotations omitted).
161. See Dillingham, 519 U.S. at 325 (1997).
162. See Corporate Health, 12 F. Supp. 2d at 614.
163. 965 F.2d 1321 (5th Cir. 1992).
164. See id. at 1331.
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clusion that ERISA bars recovery "for a tort allegedly committed in
the course of handling a benefit determination."' 65
Judge Gilmore distinguished the THCLA controversy from Corcoran, finding that a suit under the Texas statute would relate to the
quality of benefits from a managed care entity and not the withholding of benefits.' 66 She also noted that after Corcoran, the U.S.
Supreme Court had stated that an "indirect economic influence...
does not bind a plan administrator to any particular choice and thus
function as a regulation of an ERISA plan itself."' 6 7 More specifically
and relevantly, the Court has since held:
[I]f ERISA were concerned with any state action-such as quality
of care standards-that increased the cost of providing certain benefits, and thereby, potentially affected the choices made by ERISA
plans, [then] we could scarcely see the end of ERISA's
68 preemptive
reach, and the words 'relate to' would limit nothing.'

Given these assertions by the U.S. Supreme Court, federal circuit
courts have differentiated a claim about withholding benefits from a
claim about quality of benefits. 169 In particular, the Third Circuit in
Dukes v. U.S. Healthcare, Inc. held that ERISA did not preempt a
medical negligence suit brought by beneficiaries against a HMO. 7 ' It
noted that "[i]nstead of claiming that the welfare plans in any way
withheld some quantum of plan benefits due, the plaintiffs ...

com-

plain[ed] about the low quality of the medical treatment that they actually received. . .. ""'' The Dukes court held that ERISA did not

preempt the latter type of claim-one concerning the quality of a benefit received.172 Following the reasoning in Dukes, Judge Gilmore
likewise concluded that ERISA does not bar the Texas regulations
mandating standards for the "quality of benefits .
actually
provided."' 73
Aetna also alleged that the liability provision of the Texas statute
"connected with" ERISA by improperly dictating the structure of
plan benefits and their administration. It contended that the state law
"imposes a 'negligence' standard of review on HMOs and PPOs... in
165. Id. at 1332.
166. See Corporate Health, 12 F. Supp. 2d at 617.
167. New York State Conference of Blue Cross & Blue Shield Plans v. Travelers
Ins. Co., 514 U.S. 645, 659 (1995).
168. California Div. of Labor Standards Enforcement v. Dillingham, 519 U.S. 316,

329 (1997).
169. See, e.g., Pacificare of Okla., Inc. v. Burrage, 59 F.3d 151, 154 (10th Cir. 1995)
(holding that medical malpractice claim not preempted by ERISA when issue of doctor's negligence required assessment of providing admittedly covered treatment or
giving professional advice).
170. 57 F.3d 350, 357 (3d Cir. 1995).
171. See id.
172. See id.
173. Corporate Health Ins., Inc. v. Texas Dep't of Ins., 12 F. Supp. 2d 597, 620 (S.D.
Tex. 1998).
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contravention of the federally mandated abuse of discretion standard
of review of a factual benefit determination under ERISA."' 7 4 Judge
Gilmore responded that, under the statute, a person may bring a suit
that only challenges the quality of care received, not a benefit determination.' 75 The former type of claim "would not implicate the abuse
required under ERISA for factual benefit
of discretion standard
76
determinations." 1
Judge Gilmore, nonetheless, agreed with Aetna's contention that
"the provisions for an independent review improperly mandate the
administration of employee benefits and therefore, have a connection
with ERISA plans. ' 177 She reasoned that the independent review
process provisions "concern the review of an adverse benefit determination and are therefore an improper mandate of benefit administration.' 78 In Travelers, the U.S. Supreme Court held that "ERISA
preempted state laws1' 79that mandate employee benefit structures or
their administration.'
However, Judge Gilmore maintained that the independent review
process provisions of the THCLA would not affect lawsuits challenging the quality of care an enrollee received since the provisions focus
on the denial of benefit determinations, and not their quality. 8 ° Thus,
Judge Gilmore upheld the quality of care liability clauses while ordering the severance of the independent review provisions.' 8 '
Additionally, Judge Gilmore struck the THCLA provisions prohibiting MCO retaliation against health care providers advocating on behalf of their patients' 8 2 and forbidding hold-harmless clauses in
managed care contracts with physicians. Judge Gilmore found that
these mandates contractually bind employers and plan administrators
to particular provider choices and affect the structure of health benefit
plans. Like the independent review provisions, she declared these
clauses severable from the rest of the statute.1 83
The result was that Judge Gilmore upheld the right for an enrollee
to sue an MCO for damages resulting from that entity's failure to ex174. Id. at 621; see also Pierre v. Connecticut Gen. Life Ins. Co., 932 F.2d 1552, 1562
(5th Cir. 1991) (holding that "for factual determinations under ERISA plans, abuse of
discretion standard of review is the appropriate standard.").
175. See Corporate Health, 12 F. Supp. 2d at 621.
176. Id.
177. Id. at 625.
178. Id. at 626.
179. New York State Conference of Blue Cross & Blue Shield Plans v. Travelers
Ins. Co., 514 U.S. 645, 658 (1995).
180. See Corporate Health, 12 Fed. Supp. 2d at 626.
181. See id.
182. See id. at 627-28 (applying statutory restrictions in and citing TEX. CIv. PRAC.
& REM. CODE ANN. § 88.002 (Vernon Supp. 1999)).
183. See Renae Merle, Insurance Firm Seeks to Preserve HMO Review Law, AusTIN AM.-STATESMAN, Sept. 23, 1998, at B2.
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ercise ordinary care when making health care treatment decisions.1 84

The decision "opens the courthouse to injured patients and says that
1' 85
the HMO industry can no longer hide from state courts and juries.'
VII.

THE WISDOM OF TORT-BASED ACCOUNTABILITY

A.

Pending Legislation

The U.S. Congress should encourage other states to follow Texas'

lead. The 105th session of Congress considered competing Republican and Democratic bills that would establish national regulation of

managed care. 86 To a large extent, these conflicting proposals share a
common ground. Both would implement many 87of the non-tort mandates already imposed on MCOs by the states.'
Most notably, however, the bills differ on the issue of whether states
could subject MCOs to tort liability.'8 8 The Republican proposal
would not provide states that option 89 while the Democratic one
would. The latter bill would revise the ERISA doctrine by authoriz-

ing states to determine whether or not a health care beneficiary could
raise a state malpractice action against health plan administrators.
Also, like the THCLA, the Democratic bill would explicitly shield em184. Aetna appealed all of the court's holdings. Notice of Cross-Appeal, Civil Action No. H-97-2072, United States District Court for the Southern District of Texas,
Houston Division, Oct. 16, 1998. The insurance company, however, wanted to preserve the independent review provisions of the legislation. See Renae Merle, Insurance Firm Seeks to Preserve HMO Review Law, AUSTIN AM.-STATESMAN, Sept. 23,

1998, at B2.
185. See Consumers for Quality Care, Texas HMO Liability Law Upheld, (Sept. 18,
1998) (press release) (on file with the Texas Wesleyan School of Law Library).
186. See supra notes 23-24 and accompanying text.
187. Both propositions would grant women direct access to obstetricians and gynecologists. Also, both bills would guarantee patients reimbursement for emergency
care deemed necessary by a prudent lay-person and require full disclosure of medically available treatment options. Additionally, both proposals would authorize external review boards to review MCO treatment denials. The external review
provision in H.R. 4250, however, results only in a recommendation that does not bind
the MCO and would assess only whether the plan followed its own rules, not whether
the patient actually needed the denied care.
188. The bills differ in other ways, as well. Unlike H.R. 4250, H.R. 3605 would
mandate access to out-of-network providers, conditional use of specialists as primary
care providers, conditional standing referrals to specialists, continuity of care when a
physician leaves a plan, access to non-formulary prescription drugs, independent consumer assistance programs, and access to clinical trials. Also, only H.R. 3605 would
prohibit MCOs from financially incenting doctors to reduce care.
189. In fact, H.R. 4250 might worsen states' ability to impose tort accountability on
MCOs. Because it provides for expanded remedies under ERISA, federal judges
could lose their current discretion to send certain cases back to state courts. See H.R.
4250, 105th Cong. (1998); H.R. 3605, 105th Cong. (1998). Moreover, this bill could
codify in federal law that medical treatment decisions reduce to coverage decisions.
This codification would effectively nullify states' utilization review regulations.

Published by Texas A&M Law Scholarship, 2022

27

Texas Wesleyan Law Review, Vol. 6 [2022], Iss. 1, Art. 4

TEXAS WESLEYAN LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 6

ployers from liability when they do not participate in coverage determinations of the MCOs that administer their health plans. 190
The Democratic proposal, if made law, or some other federally legislated authorization of state malpractice liability for MCOs, would

prove wise. From a policy standpoint, holding MCOs liable for malpractice makes sense, when their utilization review decisions, treatment protocols, payment arrangements with providers, or other
contractual clauses result in treatment decisions that fail to meet the

ordinary care standard. It requires MCOs to respect and adhere to

the "tough trade-offs"' 19 1 society has made between health care costs

and quality.
Health

care necessarily

demands that

society make

"tragic

choices." '1 9 It necessitates decisions involving the regrettable but inevitable tension between the social want of unlimited care for every
patient and the constraints of available resources. Unfortunately, in-

creased efficiency in health care often requires limits on the provision
of costly treatment services while increased quality often necessitates
spending more on services. Despite the persistence of the idea that
economic interests should have no place in medical decisions and the
American "optimism that all things are possible,"'1 93 an unavoidable
trade-off between health care cost and quality exists. Economics do

matter in the managed care system. Indeed, it must if society wants
any limits at all on health care costs. Health care policy inevitably
makes society face the "collision between basic goals-wanting more
care for less."' 9 4
Society has implicitly decided on a balance between health care
costs and health care quality.' 95 The medical malpractice liability law
190. Doctors preferences for H.R. 3605 on the liability issue have proven strong
enough for the American Medical Association, the nation's largest doctors' organization, to abandon its traditional support of Republicans. "While the AMA is a nonpartisan organization, its political arm awarded Republican lawmakers two-thirds of
the more than $400,000 in contributions it has made in the most recent election cycle.
[Its chairman] said he could not agree but that most doctors belong to the Republican
party." Bennett Roth, Doctors' Group Joins Push for HMO Plan, HOUSTON

CHRON.,

July 17, 1998, at A6.
191. See David S. Broder, Unrealistic Solutions Won't Fix Health Care, HOUSTON
July 19, 1998, at A24.
192. Cf GUIDO CALABRESI & PHILLIP BOBBITr, TRAGIC CHOICES (1978) (explor-

CHRON.,

ing "the conflicts society confronts in the allocation of tragically scarce resources," not
only in health care but in other arenas as well).
193. Robert J. Samuelson, Having It All, NEWSWEEK, Sept. 28, 1998, at 71, 72.
194. Id. at 72.
195. The choice has proven difficult. As Robert Samuelson explains:
We have trouble discussing impersonal "trade-offs"-whether, for example,
mammograms for all women over 40 are worth the cost. Most of us reject
trade-offs for ourselves or our families. If we get sick, we want the best doctors, the newest drugs or the most advanced surgery. No questions asked.
The trouble, of course, is that if we all have what we (or our doctors) deem
desirable, health spending becomes uncontrollable. Someone has to impose
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applicable to doctors and other providers strongly evidences that society demands certain baseline levels of care. While the past decade's
rush to manage care' 96 indicates a public desire to contain the growth
in health care spending, 197 the negligence tort law applicable to providers indicates that society will permit controls on health costs to extend only so far. If the public desires enforcement of standards of
care against physicians and other providers through malpractice liability, no reason-cost control or otherwise-exists for absolving MCOs
from accountability for their decisions that affect patient care.
B.

Liability Issues

Only tort liability will force MCOs to incorporate the socially determined standard of care levels into their medical service decisions.
Currently, managed care consumers bear the costs of sub-standard
care stemming from MCO treatment decisions. 19 Tort law would
make MCOs suffer the consequences of their decisions that impinge
on medical care, thereby transferring the costs of sub-standard care.
Accordingly, MCOs would have to incorporate those costs in their calculation of whether the benefits of a particular treatment justify its
expense.
On this point, a law and economics approach to tort actions is instructive. "In unilateral accident contexts, where only one party can
make cost-justified investments in accident-cost reduction," that party
should shoulder negligence liability.' 9 9 Health care represents a unilateral process. When a consumer needs medical treatment to avoid
exacerbating an illness or injury, only the medical decision-maker can
determine 20 0 the necessary care investment to prevent the damage. 20 1
The investment often proves cost-justified in that the cost of the increlimits on what kind of care people get, or who can get it. Thus, our dilemma:
we want limits for society as a whole, but not for any of the individuals in it.
Id.
196. See supra notes 7-8 and accompanying text.
197. David Broder writes:
Medical inflation in the 1980s scared Washington, and Medicare cost controls were imposed, but not quickly enough to halt the budget hemorrhage.
But it got more action in corporate boardrooms, where runaway private
health insurance costs were killing profit margins. Employers insisted that
the insurers and providers manage those costs better. Thus, managed care
came about from the pressure of the people paying for health insurance; it
was imposed on patients, not chosen by them. And for a while, it worked.
Broder, supra note 191, at A24.
198. See supra note 34 and accompanying text.
199. Jon D. Hanson & Melissa R. Hart, Law and Economics, in A COMPANION TO
PHILOSOPHY OF THE LAW AND LEGAL THEORY 311, 316-18 (Dennis Patterson ed.,
1994).
200. When an MCO's decision impacts the care given. See supra notes 42-67 and
accompanying text.
201. Rarely, if ever, can patients treat themselves.
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mental treatment rarely exceeds the monetized value 20 2 of the worsened health of the patient stemming from a care denial. As only the
medial decision-maker can prevent the injury by rendering or permiton [that] party
ting appropriate treatment, "[i]mposing tort20liability
3
will lead to efficient care-level investments.
In managed care, an MCO often effectively acts as a controlling
medical decision-maker. 20 4 Not all diagnoses or treatment decisions
that result in a denial of care occur because of negligent provider
medical judgment. Rather, the influence of MCO cost containment
mechanisms on the physician-patient decision-making process regularly contributes-sometimes predominantly so-to the denials. Physicians and other providers "currently find themselves caught between
two conflicting obligations-complying with an MCO's cost containment provisions [to avoid removal from the MCO's selected provider
20 5
network] or ignoring such provisions to avoid malpractice liability.,
Often the latter influence proves the more immediate, if not ultimately the more powerful.20 6 In such situations, physicians should not
solely bear the malpractice liability for making negligent decisions
that they effectively lack the freedom not to make.20 7
Given managed care's transfer of medical decision-making responsibility from the patient and physician to the MCO, legal accountability for health care quality should correspondingly attach, at least in
part, to health plan providers.20 8 Otherwise, MCOs have insufficient
incentive to include non-monetary costs incurred by patients from
202. "Many critics charge that focusing on money as a measure of damages oversimplifies the way human beings value certain goods. Valuing human life in dollar
terms is said to offend and compromise the fundamental social norm of valuing
human life infinitely. As Posner himself put it when discussing the sale of babies for
adoption, 'economists like to think the unthinkable.' In response to this view, many
defenders of the cost/benefit approach to policy-making point out that, like it or not,
there is in everything we do an implicit monetary value that is placed on human life."
Hanson & Hart, supra note 199, at 329. (quoting RICHARD POSNER, ECONOMIC
ANALYSIS OF THE LAW 141 (3d ed. 1986)).
203. Hanson & Hart, supra note 199, at 326.
204. See supra notes 42-67 and accompanying text.
205. See Grosso, supra note 46, at 436.
206. MCOs can and often will terminate physicians who violate cost containment
procedures. Today, because most physicians rely on MCOs for their patient supply,
termination means bankruptcy. "If a particular MCO enrolls a substantial portion of a
physician's patients, a physician could face an economic crisis if he is not enrolled
with that plan or is terminated from that plan." Little, supra note 65, at 1427.
This lack of effective freedom to exercise medical judgment has angered physicians.
"[MCOs] should be accountable if they tie my hands and don't let me take care of the
patients the way they need to be taken care of," complains Dan Boyle, an emergency
room doctor. See Guglielmo, supra note 126, at 93.
207. See Jack K. Kilkullen, Gropingfor the Reins: ERISA, HMO Malpractice,and
Enterprise Liability, 22 AM. J.L. & MED. 7, 48 (1996) ("[A] physician's exposure to
liability should not exceed that of an engineer at General Motors for the placement of
a pick-up's gas tank.").
208. Under the previous Texas law, "injured patients [were] forced to sue physicians even when their actions are the direct result of managed care decisions." Polly
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treatment denials into their care calculations.2 " 9 As one commentator
has put it: "Unless there are consequences to a HMO for denying expensive treatment, the financial calculus of 'managed care' will always
weigh toward withholding and delaying costly care, no matter how
sorely the treatment is needed or substantially it is justified by medical
necessity." ' The absence of MCO tort liability in effect establishes "a
license for unscrupulous managed care plans to keep on endangering
people's health by cutting corners on needed care. '"211
By altering MCO incentives, tort accountability will help ensure
that the pressure for health care cost reduction does not intolerably
cut into health care quality. MCOs can conduct actuarial assessments
to determine which cost containment measures most effectively serve
both cost control and quality goals. Tort liability will provide them the
"incentive to review questionable procedures and to commit [their]
resources to finding . . . safer approach[es] to treatment. ' 21 2 Some
observers have already noted a positive change in MCO operations in
Texas.21 3
C.

Encourage Cooperation

Malpractice accountability will also likely improve care in another
manner-by encouraging providers and MCOs to work closer together. If both MCOs and providers have exposure to malpractice
liability, distrust between them may dissipate. Providers will feel
more comfortable with MCO policies if they know that MCOs must
also account for accidents resulting from those policies. Accordingly,
MCO tort liability may encourage MCOs and physicians to "work toRoss Hughes, Bush Won't Veto Bill Allowing Suits Against HMOs, HOUSTON CHRON.,
May 23, 1997, at Al.
209. MCOs do have some non-tort incentive to treat patients efficaciously. As
commentators have recognized, "[t]he integrated network has a competitive advantage [and incentive], for both statistical and economic reasons, in responding to consumers' demands for competition on quality and outcomes." Danzon, supra note 35,
at 501. Doctors and other providers, though, have these same non-tort incentives.
Still, society imposes tort liability on them.
210. Jamie Court, Close the HMO's Favorite Loophole, L.A. TIMES, Jan. 21, 1998,
at B7.
211. Sen. Edward Kennedy (D-MA), quoted in Charles Ornstein, Congress Divided

on HMO Bill, DALLAS

MORNING NEWS,

July 22, 1998, at Dl.

212. Risa B. Greene, Note, Federal Legislative Proposalsfor Medical Malpractice
Reform: Treating the Symptoms or Effecting a Cure?, 4 CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POL'Y
563, 594 (1995).
213. Opines Tommy Jacks, a Texas litigator: "I think that HMOs and other managed care companies have started changing their behavior toward enrollees, and I
think that Judge Gilmore's decision [permitting Texas' tort liability law to remain in
effect] will drive home the importance of doing that." Sarah Lunday, State, Aetna
Support HMO Review, FORT WORTH STAR-TELEGRAM, Sept. 23, 1998, at Cl. Also,
Dr. Phil Berry, an orthopedic surgeon in Dallas has noticed more responsiveness by
MCOs: "We have seen a much better attitude on the part of HMOs now as to recommendations we make for patients. They seem to be more willing to pay for what we
ask for." See Cropper, supra note 28, at A3.
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gether and share information to improve the quality of the treatment
provided"2'14 in a cost-effective manner.
D.

Critical Views

In spite of these policy rationales for the imposition of MCO tort
liability, critics remain. They have denounced tort law as too haphazard and too blunt an instrument for the regulation of institutional behavior and have argued against its expansion to new entities such as
MCOs. 1 5 The current tort regime arguably compensates victims in an
unpredictable and insufficient fashion. Harvard Law Professor Paul
Weiler laments that "[t]ort benefits are doled out in a rather arbitrary
manner to some-but not most-deserving victims, and also to those
...who are not even 'deserving' within tort law's fault-based frame of
reference." '1 6 Moreover, a recent study published in the New England Journal of Medicine evidences that the extent of a plaintiff's disability, rather than the degree of the provider's negligence, shows a
significant statistical correlation with tort recovery.21 7 Also, when
negligently treated patients do recover, almost forty percent of any
award immediately diverts to attorney's fees, irrespective of the lawyer's investment in the case.218 Additionally, the average malpractice
case may take eighteen months to adjudicate.2 1 9 This duration often
precludes recovery during periods when the victim's financial needs
prove most acute.
Furthermore, tort accountability inefficiently deters tortious behavior. Since the tort system imprecisely assesses liability, courts sometimes fail to award damages for instances that actually warrant
liability. 2 20 Such misses cause tort liability to under-deter.
Somewhat ironically, tort accountability may over-deter too. 221 To
the extent potential malpractice defendants perceive courts' imposi214. Greene, supra note 212, at 590.
215. See Jeffrey O'Connell & James F. Neale, HMO's, Cost Containment,and Early
Offers: New Malpractice Threats and a Proposed Reform, 14 J. CONTEMP. HEALTH L.
& POL'Y 287, 297 (1998). See generally Danzon, supra note 35.
216. Paul C. Weiler, The Case for No-Fault Medical Liability, 52 MD. L. REV. 908,

915 (1993).
217. See Troyen A. Brennan et al., Relation Between Negligent Adverse Events and
the Outcomes of Medical-Malpractice Litigation, 335 NEw ENG. J. MED. 1963, 1966

(1996).
218. See David S. Starr, The No-FaultAlternative to Medical Malpractice Litigation:
Compensation, Deterrence, and Viability Aspects of a Patient Compensation Scheme,
20 TEX. TECH L. REV. 803, 806-07 n.23 (1989).
219. See, Comment, The Medical Malpractice Crisis: Will No-Fault Cure the Disease? 9 HAW. L. REV. 241, 243 n.13 (1987) (noting also that 10 percent of medical
malpractice cases remain open for over six years).
220. See O'Connell & Neal, supra note 215, at 296.
221. See generally Israel Gilead, Tort Law and Internalization: The Gap Between
Private Loss and Social Cost, 17 INT'L REV. L. & ECON. 589, 600 (1997).
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tion of malpractice damages as "irrational [and] illogical"22 and unconnected to their own negligence, tort liability will over-deter. This
over-deterrence, critics of HMO tort liability fear, will lead to defensive medicine and the authorization of medically unnecessary care.22 3
Tort liability would then inject unneeded costs into the health care
system. These potential problems raise the question of "whether an
already distressed tort system should bear the additional burden of
against HMOs or whether
resolving a rush of new malpractice claims224
an alternative might better serve society.
Critics of tort liability for MCOs, however, sidestep the reality that
society has chosen tort accountability as its main mechanism to ensure
respect for customary medical care levels. More accurate, consistent,
and efficient enforcement regimes may eventually prove practical and
become established. Indeed, "in fifty years' time people [may very
well] look back with some horror on tort law as [having existed] ...
too long. ' 225 Nonetheless, if the public wants its quality of care standards respected, it should subject all medical decision-makerswhether physician, hospital, or MCO-to the same enforcement system. No reason justifies freeing MCOs from having to take responsibility for the consequences of their judgments regarding medical care.
Though the current medical malpractice regime has imperfections-to
the extent it holds physicians and other providers accountable for
their decisions affecting patients' health-it should hold MCOs
equally accountable.
Additionally, critics' worries about an explosion in litigation and increased health costs will likely prove overstated and perhaps misplaced. Lawsuits probably would not rise dramatically with MCO tort
liability. Since Texas enacted the THCLA, MCOs have suffered only
one suit,226 and of the cases that have gone before independent review
boards, about half the decisions have favored MCOs. 227 Also, while
222. Josephine Y. King, No Fault Compensationfor Medical Injuries, 8 J. CONTEMP.
L. & POL'Y 227, 235 (1992).
223. See Armand Leone Jr., As Health Care Enterprise Liability Expands ... Is
ADR the RXfor Malpractice,49 Disp. RESOL.J. 7, 10 (1994); Daniel Kessler & Mark
McClellan, Do Doctors Practice Defensive Medicine?, Q. J. OF ECON., May, 1996, at
353, 387-88 (suggesting that nationwide tort reform could produce savings of $50 billion annually without serious adverse health care consequences).
224. O'Connell & Neale, supra note 215, at 288.
225. JEFFREY O'CONNELL & C. BRIAN KELLY, THE BLAME GAME, INJURIES, INSURANCE AND INJUSTICE 139 (1987) (quoting Professor Patrick Atiyah).
226. See Plocica v. NYL Care of Texas, Inc., 43 F. Supp. 2d 658, 661 (N.D. Tex.
1999). Former Texas Trial Lawyer Association president Tommy Jacks concedes a rise
in MCO suits might occur-not so much because of the THCLA as because of the
increase in Texans enrolling in MCO health plans. See Megan H. Rhyne, Plaintiffs
Bar Doesn't Expect Suit Bonanza from HMO Law, TEX. LAW., June 9, 1997, at 15.
227. As of Sept., 23, 1998, 114 cases of the 253 filed before a binding independent
review board have been decided in favor of the MCO. See Lunday, supra note 213;
see also Poison Pills: Congress Should Not Undo State's Reform HMOs Staff, Editorial, HOUSTON CHRON., July 18, 1998, at A32.
HEALTH
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suits against MCOs may increase, the total number of medical liability
suits probably will not rise much. Injured patients already routinely
initiate suits against treating physicians, nurses, hospitals, and other
providers. MCO tort liability would merely include MCOs in this proportional liability situation. 228 Furthermore, Congress could mirror
the Texas legislature and condition a patient's right to sue an MCO for
2 29
malpractice on completion of an independent review process.
Combining tort liability with a non-judicial screening process would
"properly recognize the importance of maintaining patient rights with230
out making HMOs the target of bad lawsuits.
As the Texas experience indicates, health costs are not likely to rise
significantly. Though the Texas Association of Business and Chambers of Commerce laments a return to the "indemnity insurance days
where insurers paid for whatever the physician asked for," the evidence suggests otherwise. 23 ' Texas' full-service HMOs reported a six
month increase of only 0.7% in the amount spent on medical expenses
for each member per month since the THCLA took effect.232 By com233
parison, they reported a 4.5% increase during the prior six months.
Several accounting projections also show that MCO tort accountability will not substantially affect health care costs. Milliman and Robertson recently completed an actuarial study that estimated the cost of
the Texas liability legislation to a Texas-based MCO at 34 cents per
member per month.2 34 Similarly, Price Waterhouse projected the
likely premium increase from proposed California legislation would
range from 0.1% to 0.4%.235 The Congressional Budget Office estimated that the allowance of MCO tort liability in House Bill 3605
would only increase premiums for employer-sponsored health insurance by 1.2%.236
228. "The profound irony is that a physician operating within the rules set by the
health plan can be punished when those rules lead to a bad outcome, while the plan
itself goes scot-free." Beatrice Y. Motamedi, Legal Brief: Showdown Over Malpractice: When a Managed Care Plan Thwarts Proper Treatment, Why Do Doctors Have to
Pay the Price?, 11 HIPPOCRATES 31, 36 (1997).
229. See Cropper, supra note 28, at 7.
230. HMOs: Independent Reviews Should Be Restored, Editorial, DALLAS MORNING NEWS, Sept. 22, 1998, at A14. David Sibley explains the rationale underlying the
independent review mechanism in the THCLA: "We were looking for some way to
make it more difficult to go to court. If people had to go through a review before they
sued, that would winnow out the meritless lawsuits." Guglielmo, supra note 126, at
94.
231. See Cropper, supra note 28, at 7.
232. See id.
233. See id.
234. See THE CAMPAIGN FOR HEALTHCARE ACCOUNTABILITY, CLOSING THE MANAGED HEALTH CARE LIABILITY LOOPHOLE: A QUESTION OF SIMPLE FAIRNESS 5
(1998).
235. See Will Right-To-Sue Provision Cost Just Pennies Per Month?, MED. &
HEALTH, April 12, 1998, at 1.
236. See CONGRESSIONAL BUDGET OFFICE, COST ESTIMATE OF H.R. 3605/S. 1890
PATIENTS' BILL OF RIGHTS AcT OF 1998, July 16, 1998.
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Each of these health care cost projections are conservative in that
they ignore the non-monetary costs currently externalized by MCOs.
Enrollees suffer the burden of increased risk in having an illness or
injury exacerbated because their MCO does not have sufficient financial incentive to provide them medically necessary care.23 7 Managed
care liability would force MCOs to account for that non-financial cost
in their calculations. 2 38 The resulting reduction in the non-monetary
costs currently borne by consumers would offset most, if not all, increases in monetary costs to MCOs. While tort liability may raise
costs to MCOs, it will not necessarily raise-and may even reducethe monetary and other health care costs borne by society generally.
Moreover, even if health care costs are higher with MCO tort regulation, logic suggests it will lower expenses relative to non-tort MCO
mandates. Tort accountability will more fully allow MCOs to continue

containing health care expenditures. Removing managed care's check
on decisions made by physicians and patients and generally mandating

access to certain medical services without regard for particular need
severely restricts MCOs' ability to manage health care costs. Such
non-tort measures will indiscriminately make MCOs and providers do
more, and "[r]equiring insurers and providers to do more inevitably
means they will charge more.

2 39

Tort regulations will also encourage MCOs to do more-but only
when the standard of care dictates a need for additional treatment.
Indeed, theoretically, tort liability will not affect MCO decision-mak-

ing. MCOs currently review treatment decisions for their "medical
237. See Corcoran v. United Health Care Inc., 965 F.2d 1321, 1338 (5th Cir. 1992)
(recognizing this dilemma).
[The absence of tort liability] eliminates an important check on the
thousands of medical decisions routinely made in the burgeoning utilization
review system. With liability rules generally inapplicable [due to ERISA],
there is theoretically less deterrence of substandard medical decision making. Moreover, if the cost of compliance with a standard of care ... need not
be factored into utilization review companies' cost of doing business, bad
medical judgments will end up being cost-free to the plans that rely on these
companies to contain medical costs.
Id.
238. Editorials have echoed this concern. See, e.g., Robert J. Provan, Law Would
Hold MCOs More Accountable, SAN ANTONIO EXPRESS NEWS, May 19, 1997, at A19
("MCOs claim that any accountability will cause the costs of health care to rise .... If
so, that must mean MCOs are making many costly mistakes and that they are seeking
to avoid paying the cost of those mistakes. So, who should bear them-the victim or
the perpetrator?"). "While a price tag should never be put on a human life, there
should be some reasonable compensation paid to patients and their families who are
victims of medical malpractice. This is especially true when victims suffer their lifealtering, if not fatal injuries due directly to the negligence of a plan executive attempting to save money." Federal Initiatives on Quality of Care: Hearingson S. 449, S. 644
h
Before the Senate Comm. on Labor and Human Resources, 1051 Congress (1997)
(Statements of Dr. William A. Reynolds, President of the American College of
Physicians).
239. Broder, supra note 191, at A24.
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necessity." 24 Rather than directly prohibit that cost containment
practice, tort accountability will simply ensure that MCOs' definitions
of "medical necessity" encompass society's tort-enforced standards of
care.
Juxtaposition of the economic impact of tort regulation with that of
non-tort mandates may explain why employers do not think health
care premiums will rise substantially with MCO malpractice liability.
In fact, sixty-one percent of small business executives support allowing patients to sue health plans.24 '

At bottom, Congressional authorization of tort liability similar to
that in Texas would force MCOs to respect socially-determined care
levels and likely would not have much negative effect on malpractice
litigation and health care costs. As a Texas surgeon testified to Congress: "I am happy to report that despite a cry from insurance executives, the sky did not fall, premiums did not skyrocket, and there24 2has
not been a single lawsuit. The Texas law is working very well.
CONCLUSION

Congress should amend ERISA or enact other legislation that unequivocally permits states to impose malpractice standards on MCOs.
Managed care entities affect the actual medical care rendered to patients, and non-tort regulations insufficiently make them accountable
for that control. Tort responsibility would force MCOs to consider the
non-monetary costs of sub-optimal care decisions in assessing whether
the benefits of a treatment warrant its expense. In doing so, MCOs
are unlikely to reduce health care costs in ways that make socially
intolerable sacrifices in care.
Authorization for states to institute MCO malpractice liability, however, must come from Congress. Judicial permission has proven unreliable as courts have struggled with the question of whether ERISA
preemption doctrine precludes states from imposing tort liability on
MCOs. 2 43 Nothing indicates that the judiciary can ultimately resolve
this issue without legislative guidance.
Despite Corporate Health, federal courts in general have been inconsistent in their decisions on whether ERISA preempts states from
holding MCOs liable for the quality of the benefits they provide.
2 4 4 the extent of ERISA's protection
Since Travelers and Dillingham,

240. See supra notes 43-44 and accompanying text.
241. Survey by the Kaiser Family Foundation and Harvard School of Public Health,
June 16, 1997.
242. Dr. Robert Sloane, quoted in Ornstein, supra note 211, at D1.
243. As former Labor Secretary Robert B. Reich admonished: "The situation [ERISA preemption of state tort claims] must be corrected. If the courts won't do it,
Congress must." Clinton Administration Considers NarrowingScope of ERISA, MANAGED CARE LAW OUTLOOK, Jan. 14, 1997, available in 1997 WL 9731157.

244. See supra note 155 and accompanying text.
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of MCOs has undoubtedly eroded. Numerous courts have recognized
the inequities of ERISA preemption of state malpractice claims
against MCOs and have accordingly narrowed it. In Dukes, for example, the Third Circuit held a managed care plan liable for poor coordination and supervision of its contracted health care providers. 245 The
court determined that ERISA does not preempt state regulation of
the quality of the provision of health care services. 246 The Tenth and
Seventh Circuits likewise determined that ERISA does not preclude
state enforcement of medical standards against MCOs. 247 Also, Federal district 24 8 and state courts 249 have allowed claims relating to
MCOs' direct roles in the negligent provision of medical care.
The architects of ERISA never contemplated that managed care
concerns would integrate decisions to pay for care and medical judgMCOs now determine the provision of care not only on the
ments.2
basis of whether a benefit plan covers such care but also on the basis
of the "medical necessity" of such treatment.2 5 1 When these medical
necessity decisions lead to harm, ERISA allows patients only the cost
of the benefit denied. 2 This remedy, while perhaps appropriate
when a benefit plan denies an employee a pension benefit, proves in245. See 57 F.3d 350 (3d Cir. 1995).
246. See id.
247. See Pacificare of Oklahoma v. Burrage, 59 F. 3d 151, 155 (10th Cir. 1995)
(holding that ERISA did not preempt a vicarious liability claim against an MCO for
its physician's malpractice); Rice v. Panchal, 65 F.3d 637, 646 (7th Cir. 1995) (holding
that ERISA did not preempt a handicapped patient's claim against an MCO under
state law theory of respondeat superior).
248. See, e.g., Kampmeier v. Sacred Heart Hosp., No. 95-7816, 1996 WL220979 at
*3 (E.D. Pa. May 2, 1996) (holding an MCO directly liable for its procedures regarding the approval of reimbursement for diagnostic exams)
249. See Pappas v. Asbel, 675 A.2d 711, 718 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1996) (holding that
ERISA did not preempt a direct negligence claim against an MCO for refusing to
authorize a patient's transfer to a spinal cord trauma unit despite the treating physician's judgment that patient's neuralgic emergency immediately required it); Shannon
v. McNulty, 718 A.2d 828, 831 (Pa. Super Ct. 1998) (holding that plaintiffs made a
prima facie case against MCO for both vicarious liability and direct corporate
liability).
250. The Third Circuit researched ERISA's legislative history, concluding:
We find nothing in the legislative history suggesting that Section 502 (ERISA) was intended as part of a federal scheme to control the quality of benefits received by plan participants. Quality control of benefits, such as the
health care benefits provided here, is a field traditionally occupied by state
regulation, and we interpret the silence of Congress as an intent that it
should remain such.
Dukes v. U.S. Helathcare Inc., 57 F.3d 350, 357 (3d Cir. 1995). This determination
comports with that of the U.S. Supreme Court: "[N]othing in the language of the act
... indicates that Congress chose to displace general health care regulation, which has
historically been a matter of local concern." New York State Conference of Blue
Cross & Blue Shield Plans v. Travelers Ins. Co., 115 S. Ct. 1671, 1679 (1995).
251. See supra notes 37-63 and accompanying text.
252. See Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 § 502(a), 29 U.S.C.
§ 1132(a) (1994); see also Berkeley Rice, Look Who's on the Malpractice Hot Seat
Now; But Don't Think Doctors Are Off the Hook, MED. ECON., Aug. 12, 1996, at 200.
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adequate with health care matters." 3 In health care, the cost of the
benefit denied often proves only a fraction of the ultimate loss to the

consumer. 254 Congress could not have intended for ERISA to limit a
harmed patient's recourse in this inequitable manner.
Despite this legislative support for a narrow reading of ERISA's
preemption of state tort claims, some courts have nonetheless upheld
MCOs' defense of ERISA preemption. In Schmidt v. Kaiser,2 55 the

court conceded that an MCO's administrative functions often require
it to judge the "medical necessity" of treatments. Nevertheless, the
court held that ERISA preempted the plaintiff's negligent managed
care claims. Resolution of conflicting interpretations of ERISA's preemption 256 along with more definitive case law on the issue will take
time-perhaps too much time-to develop.
Until Congress clarifies the extent of ERISA's breadth, the 51 million Americans 257 who receive their health coverage from ERISAgoverned employer "self insurers" have no guaranteed access to state
managed care tort protections. MCOs will continue to lack sufficient
incentive to avoid making medical decisions that might ultimately

harm patients. They can argue ERISA immunity while leaving doctors and other health care providers as the sole possible defendants in
lawsuits for medical negligence. Clearly, Congress should remove the
perceived hindrance of ERISA to states' imposition of MCO medical
malpractice liability.

Regardless of the action ultimately taken on managed care tort lia-

bility, Congress should not undermine Texas' progress. Ideally, federal legislation would clarify that ERISA does not preempt a state's

privilege to enforce medical standards through health plan accounta-

253. "'The courts are seeing that the remedies provided under ERISA don't fit the
bill [in health care matters],' says Joel Michaels, an attorney who has handled cases
for the American Association of Health Plans." Motamedi, supra note 228, at 36.
254. For example, if a woman dies of breast cancer because her MCO negligently
denied payment for a specialist's consultation and mammogram that could have saved
her life, her estate could recovery only the cost of the denied care-perhaps $200.
255. 963 F. Supp. 942, 944-45 (D. Or. 1997).
256. See Corcoran v. United Health Care, Inc., 965 F.2d 1321 (5th Cir. 1992) (finding that utilization review denial of hospitalization to a woman with a high-risk pregnancy constituted a benefits determination and thus holding that ERISA preempted a
suit challenging that decision). Note that the Fifth Circuit decided Corcoran prior to
Travelers. Judge Gilmore in Corporate Health speculates that the Fifth Circuit might
have decided Corcoran differently post-Travelers: "In light of the Supreme Court's
recent mandate regarding ERISA preemption analysis, perhaps the Fifth Circuit
would reach a different decision in Corcoran today." Corporate Health Ins., Inc. v.
Texas Dep't of Ins., 12 F. Supp. 2d 597, 617 (S.D. Tex. 1998). Language from Corcoran supports her conjecture. The Fifth Circuit regretted the implication of its ERISA
determination: "The result ERISA compels us to reach means that the Corcorans
have no remedy, state or federal, for what may have been a serious mistake. This is
troubling for several reasons. First, it eliminates an important check on thousands of
medical decisions routinely made in the burgeoning utilization review system." Corcoran, 965 F.2d at 1338.
257. See FAMILIES USA FoUND., supra note 11, at 27.
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bility. As Judge Gilmore implored in CorporateHealth, "[i]f Congress
wants American citizens to have adequate health care, then Congress
must accept its responsibility to define the scope of the ERISA pre"258 In the alternative, Congress should at least designate
emption.
Texas as a "pilot project ' 259 for a number of years so that a future
Congress can measure, assess, and ultimately benefit from the state's
positive experience.

258. Corporate Health, 12 F. Supp. 2d 597, 616 n.7.
259. See Letter from John Smithee, Chairman, Tex. House Comm. On Ins., to the
Tex. Congressional Delegation 1 (July 22. 1998) (on file with author).
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